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I. INTRODUCTION
Existing California judicial precedent uniformly holds that damages
recovered' by a married person based on the wrongful death of a relative of
the married person during the marriage2-and while the spouses were not
living separate and apart3-is entirely community property.4 Under the
theoretical basis for this community property classification, it is irrelevant
that the person tortiously killed was a child or grandchild only of the
plaintiff- or payee-spouse and had no legally recognized relationship to that
party's husband or wife, who becomes owner of half the recovery because of
its classification as community property.5  This Article rejects this
community property classification of all components of wrongful death
recoveries as illogical.
1. This Article refers to recovery of wrongful death damages without distinguishing between
situations where a plaintiff-spouse recovers through a wrongful death judgment after litigation and
situations where a plaintiff-spouse recovers based on a settlement agreement made with the
tortfeasor or the tortfeasor's insurer. Whether the legally appropriate classification of the recovery is
separate property of the plaintiff-spouse, community property, or a mix of both separate and
community property could not turn on the difference between recovery after completed litigation and
recovery based on a settlement agreement with the tortfeasor.
2. In the balance of this Article, when reference is made to recovery of wrongful death
damages by a married person, it is to be assumed, unless stated otherwise, that the recovery is based
on the death of a relative of the spouse that occurred during marriage and not before the marriage.
3. According to section 771 of the California Family Code, "accumulations" by a married
person "while living separate and apart from the other spouse" are separate property of the acquiring
spouse. A wrongful death recovery should be such an "accumulation[]." More importantly, a cause
of action in tort for wrongful death arising at the time the plaintiff-spouse's relative is tortiously
killed will be viewed as such an "accumulation[]." Thus, the courts will examine whether the
plaintiff and his or her spouse were living separate and apart not at the time the funds constituting a
wrongful death recovery were received by the married person, but at the time of death of the relative
of the plaintiff-spouse upon which the cause of action asserted is based. So, if Husband and Wife
are living apart and litigating their divorce when Wife's child is tortiously killed, the pair divorce but
later remarry, and thereafter Wife collects $1 million from the tortfeasor based on the child's death,
the recovery is separate property by tracing the money back to the arising of the cause of action for
wrongful death at a time section 771 was applicable. It is assumed in the balance of this Article that
section 771 has no application to any discussion concerning a wrongful death recovery by a husband
or wife (or a former husband or wife) unless the living-apart doctrine is specifically mentioned.
4. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
5. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
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The line of precedents requiring this community property classification
for wrongful death recoveries dates to a 1922 decision by a California court
of appeal;6 the decision held that a married person's wrongful death recovery
should be classified in the same manner as recovery based on personal
injuries tortiously inflicted on the body of that person during marriage.! The
law in 1922 concerning classification of recoveries based on a married
person's tortiously-inflicted personal injuries rested on an 1891 California
Supreme Court decision8 that was viewed-not unreasonably-as holding
that no portion of the personal injury recovery (which was presumptively
community property because it was acquired during marriage) could be
classified as the victim-spouse's separate property by tracing it to a separate
property source other than the tort cause of action itself. For example, if a
victim-wife had her leg-which was part of her before marriage and hence
her separate property, if viewed as property-sheared off in an accident
negligently caused by a tortfeasor,9 tracing the money damages to the
separate leg would be impermissible.'o
In the absence of an applicable statute, the approaches judges take in
classifying recoveries based on personal injuries to a married person have
changed substantially since 1922. A relatively new theoretical approach,
which can be called "in-lieu tracing," is now often applied. It asks what was
lost by the victim-spouse that resulted in a recovery." For example, if an
insurance company pays benefits to a husband on a disability policy and the
husband cannot work due to metastasized cancer but is beyond normal
retirement age, the payment is seen as in lieu of retirement benefits.12 Thus,
the law applicable to classifying retirement benefits as community or
separate would be employed, i.e., the payments would be traced to the
premiums paid for the insurance." If no statute precluded application of in-
lieu tracing, a personal injury recovery based a spouse's lost leg in a
tortiously-caused accident during marriage would be classified by tracing the
money to the leg-something the victim-spouse brought to the marriage. 14
The amount of the total recovery based on the loss of the leg would be the
6. Keena v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 207 P. 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922). See infra text accompanying
notes 55-63.
7. Keena,207P.at37-38.
8. McFadden v. Santa Ana, 0. & T. St. Ry. Co., 25 P. 681 (Cal. 1891). See infra text
accompanying notes 24-36.
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part V.A-D.
12. See Saslow v. Saslow (In re Marriage of Saslow), 710 P.2d 346, 352 (Cal. 1985); infra Part
VI.D.2; see also Elfmont v. Elfmont (In re Marriage of Elfmont), 891 P.2d 136 (Cal. 1995).
13. Saslow, 710 P.2d at 357.
14. See WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 146 (1980).
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victim's separate property, even though the cause of action arose and
payment was made during marriage.
This Article concludes that modem in-lieu tracing precedents require
overruling the 1922 wrongful death decision and its progeny that bar
potential tracing of a married person's loss based on the death of a relative to
a separate property source and that erroneously compel classifying all
components of damages recovered as community property."
Conversely, another line of older authority under which all wrongful
death recoveries had to be classified as community property does not need to
be overruled." This line of cases began with a 1924 court of appeal
decision 8 and was based on language then found in section 376 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure (Section 376).'9 The 1924 court's
interpretation of Section 376 was unsound from the outset, as this Article
demonstrates.2o In any event, in 1949 the statute was amended and the
language was removed; this necessarily abrogated the second line of older
precedents that mandated classifying 100% of a wrongful death recovery by
a married person as community property.21
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CALIFORNIA'S ORIGINAL No-TRACING RULE
EMPLOYED IN CLASSIFYING PERSONAL INJURY RECOVERIES IN GENERAL
A. The 1891 McFadden Decision
The line of cases dealing with classification of wrongful death
recoveries by a husband or wife that began in 1922 rests on a judicial
borrowing of the approach used in classifying personal injury recoveries.
Thus, analysis of the pertinent law properly begins with the earliest cases
classifying property as community or separate when determining who should
recover damages for a spouse's personal injury, e.g., a concussion suffered
in an automobile accident. 22
15. Id.
16. See infra Part VII.
17. See infra Part IV.D.
18. Sandberg v. McGilvray-Raymond Granite Co., 226 P. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924). See infra
text accompanying notes 71-85.
19. See infra Part IV.B.1.
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. See infra Part IV.D.
22. See McFadden v. Santa Ana, 0. & T. St. Ry. Co., 25 P. 681, 681-82 (Cal. 1891).
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The first reported decision to consider how the community property
system23 applied to classify damages recovered by a husband or wife based
on his or her tortiously-caused personal injuries was by the California
Supreme Court in 1891.24 In McFadden v. Santa Ana, 0. & T St. Ry. Co., a
married woman was in a vehicle-described as a "three-spring buggy,
without a top" 2 5-that fell into the defendant's unmarked and negligently-
created street excavation
whereby Flora McFadden sustained great injuries in her person, and
internal injuries by which her womb was displaced, and by reason
of said injuries to her person and said internal injuries, she was
confined to her bed for many months, and endured great physical
and mental suffering. Her health is injured and impaired
thereby .... 26
A judgment for the plaintiff-wife was reversed because the jury had
been instructed that her husband's contributory negligence could not be
imputed to her.27 The trial court had refused the defendant's request for this
instruction on the ground that the wife's recovery would be her separate
property.28 Since it would not be co-owned in community with her husband,
his contributory negligence would be legally irrelevant because the husband
would not profit from his own wrong.29 But the California Supreme Court
held that the trial court erred in declaring that the wife's recovery would be
her separate property and held that
23. It followed two peculiar decisions of the California Supreme Court that declared that a
wife's cause of action in tort for personal injuries was her separate property under the common law
of England in effect in California. Matthew v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 63 Cal. 450, 451 (1883)
(negligent starting up of train caused wife to be violently thrown to the floor of a car; "[tihe cause of
action is hers."); Sheldon v. Steamship Uncle Sam, 18 Cal. 526, 533-34 (1861) (false imprisonment
caused injuries to wife and under "common law" she was "entitled to [compensation]"). It is hard to
imagine how all of the justices participating in both of these cases could have forgotten that at the
time of these decisions the state constitution contained a provision, CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 14
(1849), that required application of the civil law to marital property issues. This constitutional
proviso had been vigorously debated at the initial constitutional convention before its adoption and
constituted a major exception to the state's adoption, in general, of the common law. See J. Ross
BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF
THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1849, at 257-69 (1850), excerpted in
REPPY, supra note 14, at 9-12.
24. McFadden, 25 P. at 681.
25. Transcript on Appeal at 34, McFadden v. Santa Ana, 0. & T. St. Ry. Co., 25 P. 681 (1891)
(No. 13,919).
26. McFadden, 25 P. at 682 (emphasis added). The treating physician testified that the victim-
wife suffered "an anti-flexon of the second degree, combined with prolapsus." Transcript on
Appeal, supra note 25, at 38.
27. McFadden, 25 P. at 683.
28. Id. at 682.
29. Id. at 682-83.
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[t]he right to recover damages for a personal injury, as well as the
money recovered as damages, is property, and may be regarded as a
chose in action . .. and, if this right to damages is acquired by the
wife during marriage, it, like the damages when recovered in
money, is ... community property of the husband and wife (Civil
Code, §§ 162-164, 169[]). . . .o
The court was willing to trace the money the injured spouse received back to
the cause of action but would not trace the cause of action back to the
victim's body." When McFadden was decided in 1891, California Civil
Code section 162 provided, "All property of the wife, owned by her before
marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise or descent,
with the rents, issues and profits thereof, is her separate property."32 Section
164 then provided, "All other property acquired after marriage, by either
husband or wife, is community property." If money damages were
received during marriage, it is clear that the McFadden court did not view
section 164 as barring classifying the victim-spouse's damages as separate
property by tracing them back to a tort cause of action that arose before
marriage-"property owned ... before marriage" under section 162. The
possibility of other kinds of tracing seems not to have been considered.
Four years later, the California Supreme Court expanded upon the
significance of sections 162 and 164 as they then read in classifying personal
injury damages. 35 The 1895 case involved personal injury damages arising
out of an assault on a married woman, and the court held:
The separate property of the wife is declared in section 162, Civ.
Code, to be "all property owned by her before marriage, and that
acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise or descent"; and section
164, Id., declares that "all other property acquired after marriage"
by the wife is community property. Whatever may be the law in
other states, in this state the separate property of the wife, which is
30. Id. at 682 (some citations omitted).
3 1. Id.
32. This quote was taken from former section 162 of the California Civil Code which is now in
section 770 of the California Family Code. In 1992 section 770 was enacted by section 10 of the
Statutes of California, replacing section 5108 of the California Civil Code. In 1969 section 5108
was replaced by section 164 of the California Civil Code via section 9 of the Statutes of California.
33. This quote was taken from former section 164 of the California Civil Code which was
renumbered as section 5110 of the California Civil Code in 1969. In 1992 section 5110 was
repealed when it became Section 760 of the Family Code.
34. McFadden, 25 P. at 682-83.
35. Lamb v. Harbaugh, 39 P. 56 (Cal. 1895).
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acquired by her after marriage, is limited to such as she acquires by
"gift, bequest, devise and descent." As a right of action for
damages for a personal injury is not acquired by either of these
modes, it is a part of the "other property acquired after marriage,"
and is therefore community property.
B. Precedents and Secondary Authority Existing When McFadden Was
Decided
In McFadden, the cornerstone decision for the judge-made rule that
100% of personal injury damages arising out of a tort during marriage must
be community property, counsel for the victim-wife made no argument in
brief for a separate property classification. Instead, counsel argued that the
fact the husband would own half of the wife's recovery in community was
not a sufficient basis for imputing the husband's contributory negligence to
the wife.37  It is not surprising that counsel for the wife did not seek a
separate property classification. Although the issue was res nova in
California, all the then-reported precedents from other community property
states that had considered the matter had held that a spouse's personal injury
damages had to be entirely community property because they were acquired
36. Id. at 58. In Washington, when the law there also classified 100% of a married person's
personal injury recovery as community property on precisely the same logic as employed in Lamb,
the courts there quaintly said they were applying the "waste basket definition of community
property." Brown v. Brown (In re Marriage of Brown), 675 P.2d 1207, 1210 (Wash. 1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted) ("'This "waste basket" definition of community property results in
property being characterized as community unless it meets the definition of separate
property.... [F]ortuitous acquisition of damages for personal injury by a third party tort-feasor is
community property because it does not fit within the definition of separate property."' (quoting In
re Marriage of Parsons, 622 P.2d 415, 416 (Wash. App. 1981))). Brown ultimately overruled the
cases that took this approach. Lamb cited the 1891 McFadden decision. Lamb, 39 P. at 58. In
several other decisions on the books jn 1922 (when the issue of classifying a wrongful death
recovery was first decided in a reported decision) the court classified a married person's personal
injury recovery as community property and cited McFadden, including Doyle v. Doyle, 186 P. 188,
190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919), and Justis v. Atchison, T & S. Railway Co., 108 P. 328, 329 (Cal. Ct. App.
1910).
37. In their petition for a rehearing, Respondents argued that the negligence of the husband there
should not be imputed to his wife:
[T]o say that the negligence of the husband should be imputed to the wife for the reason
that the judgment secured for the damages sustained by the wife is community property,
is not a sufficient reason.
We cannot say that it is a common undertaking because the results of that undertaking
may in some way accrue to the benefit of another party. In order to identify the party
having this resulting interest in this judgment as being connected in a common
undertaking with the other plaintiff, there must be something other and further than this.
Petition for a Rehearing at 4, McFadden v. Santa Ana, 0. & T. St. Ry. Co., 25 P. 681 (1891) (No.
13,919).
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during marriage by a process other than inheritance, bequest, devise, or
gift.38
In 1890, when McFadden was briefed and argued, there were two
English language treatises in print on the law of Spain and Mexico39 that
included discussions of community property law40 and that had been cited by
the California Supreme Court as good sources of civil law principles.4
Neither treatise addressed whether a recovery of damages for personal
injuries by a married person was community property or the victim's
separate property. One did suggest that, as a matter of civil law procedure
(which would not be part of California law), if the wife were the tort victim,
she was a necessary party in a suit for damages and she could not appear in
court without her husband's permission, although the court could compel
him to give his assent.42
38. See Holzab v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. Co., 38 La. Ann. 185, 188 (1886); Cooper v.
Cappel, 29 La. Ann. 213, 215-16 (1877) (dictum); Loper v. W. Union Tel. Co., 8 S.W. 600, 602
(Tex. 1888); Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331, 332 (1883) (personal injury recovery not acquired by
gift, bequest, or descent), overruled in part by Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 395 (Tex. 1992).
39. GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO (1851); 1-2 JOSEPH M.
WHITE, A NEW COLLECTION OF LAWS, CHARTERS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN,
FRANCE AND SPAIN, RELATING TO THE CONCESSIONS OF LAND IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COLONIES;
TOGETHER WITH THE LAWS OF MEXICO AND TEXAS ON THE SAME SUBJECT (1839).
40. See SCHMIDT, supra note 39, tit. I, ch. IV, at 12-14; Ignacio Jordan De Asso Y Del Rio &
Miguel Manuel Y Rodriguez, Institutes of the Civil Law of Spain (Judge Johnson trans., 1839), in I
WHITE, supra note 39, bk. 1, tit. VII, cap. 5, at 60-63.
41. See, e.g., Braly v. Reese, 51 Cal. 447, 463 n.al, 464 n.dI (1876) (citing SCHMIDT, supra
note 39; WHITE, supra note 39); Wilson v. Castro, 31 Cal. 420, 433 (1866) (citing SCHMIDT, supra
note 39); Noe v. Card, 14 Cal. 576, 604-05 (1860) (citing WHITE, supra note 39).
42. Asso & Manuel, supra note 40, at 272 ("[T]he wife cannot appear in suit without the
permission of her husband, . . . and the judge may also, with cognisance of the cause, obligate the
husband to give his assent."). Conceivably the wife was viewed as a necessary party because the
damages would be her separate property; but she also could have been a necessary party so the court
could have before it the very person claiming to have been tortiously injured, even though the
damages awarded would be community property subject to the husband's management, and for
which, in most situations, he would be the party to bring suit in court. De Funiak writes that in
Spain, by the sixteenth-century, a wife could sue for her own personal injuries without obtaining her
husband's consent. WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY § 81, at 198 (2d ed. 1971). In the same passage de Funiak quotes the Spanish statute
book, Las Siete Partidas, which he dates as of 1263: "Wrong or dishonor [i.e., a tort] can be
committed against any male or female of any age whatsoever." Id. at 49. Based on this, de Funiak
concludes: "Thus, the injury to the person of a wife was compensable to her to the extent that her
property was injured or destroyed." Id. By "compensable to her," de Funiak intends to say that at
civil law in Spain the recovery was the wife's separate property pursuant to Las Siete Partidas. I do
not think Law 9-from which de Funiak quotes-supports this conclusion. Law 9 actually goes on
to say, "[A] father can bring suit for damages for dishonor done to his son . .. and a husband can do
this in behalf of his wife." 5 LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, UNDERWORLDS: THE DEAD, THE CRIMINAL, AND
THE MARGINALIZED 1356 (Robert I. Bums ed., Samuel Parsons Scott trans., 2001) (emphasis
added). If any inference concerning classification is to be drawn from Law 9, this language could
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Nor, apparently, did legal treatises written in Spanish-that the
California Supreme Court had, before the 1891 McFadden decision, been
consulting to determine the fine points of civil law of marital property-
address the issue concerning classification as community or separate
property of personal injury damages. I have personally translated 3 the
chapters on community property (bienes gananciales) in two of such
treatises44 that were most frequently cited by the California Supreme Court.45
Neither treatise discussed or even alluded to whether under civil law a
recovery of personal injury damages would be classified as community or
separate property.
indicate that the recovery for the wife's personal injury damages would be community property
managed by her husband. De Funiak also cites a commentary to Law 55, Leyes de Toro, for the
proposition that a wife could sue without her husband's consent for her personal injury damages,
suggesting this was so because they would not be community property. The passage cited, as
translated by myself and Sandra Newmeyer, Duke Law School class of 2011, states:
Here, doubt is shed on whether a wife is required to show the husband's permission in
order to defend in a criminal trial, in which she is accused. It is resolved by Acevedo,
number 108, that common usage has established the lack of need for such permission,
even if it is contradicted by our [statutory] law. But it appears to me that, without
contravening the disposition of the law, one can say it is unnecessary to require the
permission of the husband, because it can be supplied by the trial judge, and furthermore
in that case the woman is required to satisfy the charges that have been brought against
her. And when it is necessary [for the wife] to convey her property rights, it is
recognized by Acevedo in number 81 that the husband's consent is not necessary; for the
same reason it is unnecessary in this case [i.e., of a criminal prosecution]. This becomes
evident in light of what is provided in Laws 77 and 78, which state that for a crime the
married woman may lose in part or in whole her possessions of any type. The laws (77
and 78) prove without doubt that the present law and other laws that favor the husband,
which require his consent so that the woman can convey and acquire property, have no
effect, since otherwise one would have to say that the application of Laws 77 and 78
depend on the voluntary act of the husband, who would surely never give his consent for
the conveyance of the wife's properties.
2 DON SANCHO DE LLAMAS Y MOLINA, COMENTARIO CRITICO-JURIDICO-LITERAL A' LAS OCHENTA
Y TRES LEYES DE TORO, COMENTARIO A' LEY 55 DE TORO 178-79 (Madrid, Imprenta de Repulles
1827). To me this says no more than that a wife managed her own separate property.
43. With help from numerous Duke Law School students over the past thirty years who were
fluent in Spanish.
44. These treatises are Josef Febrero's Libreria de Escribanos and Joaquin Escriche y Martin's
Diccionario Razanado de Legislacion Civil, Penal, Commerical y Forense. Each appeared in
various editions. The editions I translated from were the 1834 edition of Febrero published in
Mexico City and edited by Eugenio Tapia and generally referred to as "Febrero Mejicano" (often
abbreviated in court citations as "Feb. Mej." or "Feb. Mex."), and the 1831 edition of Escriche
published in Paris. See JOSEF FEBERO, LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBANOSE INSTRUCCION JURIDICA TEORICO
PRACTICA DE PRINCIPIANTES tit. XI, cap. X, at 217 (1834); JOAQUIN ESCRICHE Y MARTIN'S
DICCIONARIO RAZANADO DE LEGISLACION CIVIL, PENAL, COMMERICAL Y FORENSE 71 (1831). De
Funiak disparages Febrero as a mere notario, not a scholarly Spanish jurisconsult. WILLIAM Q. DE
FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 26 (1st ed. 1943). Yet Febrero's treatise was
apparently widely available in California in the middle of the nineteenth-century and frequently
consulted by lawyers and judges.
45. Illustrative cases include Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488, 499, 502-04, 515 (1851) (citing
Tapia's FEBRERO, supra note 44, and ESCRICHE, supra note 44), and Fuller v. Ferguson, 23 Cal.
546, 565 (1864) (citing FEBRERO, supra note 44, on a community property issue).
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C. Tracing Separate Property Through Mutations
In the absence of any useful secondary material or judicial precedent
dealing specifically with the classification of personal injury damages as
separate or community property, the best theory that the wife's counsel in
McFadden had for seeking a separate property classification was that the
damages awarded constituted a "mutation" of an item of separate property
the wife brought to the marriage: her womb-part of her own body-which
was injured in the accident. The theory would have involved recognition of
three mutations: (1) a healthy womb transformed into a damaged womb
together with a cause of action in tort; (2) the cause of action transformed
into a judgment; and (3) the judgment converted into money. This mutation
theory had some support in an 1866 decision of the California Supreme
Court and certainly was worth pursuing.46 It was unhesitatingly applied in
1938 in a case where the wife's tortiously-damaged separate property was an
item of tangible personalty-a motor vehicle-rather than a part of her
body.47 Applicability of the tracing-through-mutation theory might have
been more apparent to the wife's attorney in McFadden had her leg
(arguably her separate property and certainly not community) been sheared
off and she sought damages in part so that she could buy a prosthetic leg to
replace the natural leg.48
46. Peck v. Vandenberg, 30 Cal. 11 (1866), stated the law of California to be (quoting from a
Texas decision) as follows:
"[T]o maintain the character of separate property it is not necessary that the property of
either husband or wife should be preserved in specie or kind. It may undergo mutations
and changes, and still remain separate property; and as long as it can be clearly and
indisputably traced and identified, its distinctive character will remain." . . . Of course, to
trace the property through its "mutations and changes" . . . requires evidence other than
written ....
Id. at 38-39. In Peck the court favorably discusses a Louisiana case, Dominguez v. Lee, 17 La. 295
(1841), where the mutations of separate property went from something tangible to a cause of action
and back to something tangible. Peck, 30 Cal. at 30. The wife's tutor (surely a fiduciary) had
embezzled some separate property funds the wife had inherited. She settled her conversion cause of
action against the embezzler by taking, during marriage, a grant of land from him, which was held to
be her separate property by tracing back to the inheritance. Id.
47. Scoville v. Keglor, 80 P.2d 162, 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938) ($600 recovery for damages to
separately owned car segregated from balance of negligence case award to wife for her personal
injuries, which was community property).
48. It does not necessarily follow that the prosthetic leg would remain community property
when attached to the wife if it was purchased with community funds. The law might apply the
fixtures doctrine to that situation, under which a structure paid for with community funds and built
on a spouse's separate property becomes separate property and creates a right of reimbursement in
the community. See Warren v. Warren (In re Marriage of Warren), 104 Cal. Rptr. 860, 862-63 (Ct.
App. 1972). A somewhat stronger case for applying the fixtures doctrine than the removable
prosthetic leg would be $10,000 of gold embedded in a spouse's teeth as a result of extensive dental
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III. APPLYING THE RESTRICTED TRACING RULE OF PERSONAL
INJURY DECISIONS IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF
WRONGFUL DEATH RECOVERY BY A SPOUSE
A. The 1922 Keena Decision by the Court ofAppeal
Between 1891 and 1922, the California rule that 100% of personal
injury damages awarded to a married person had to be classified as
community property was repeatedly adhered to,49 but developments outside
California during this period initiated the formulation of what is now the
overwhelming majority rule: the damages are part separate and part
community depending on the nature of the loss compensated by each
component of the damages.50  A 1902 Louisiana statute that seemed on its
face to classify 100% of a wife's personal injury damages as her separate
property" was judicially construed as permitting a community classification
for the amount of the damages reimbursing the community for medical bills
incurred by the victims2 and the amount of damages based on wages she lost
due to the injury. Additionally, a treatise published in 1910 proposed that,
as a matter of judge-made law, part of the award for personal injury damages
work paid for with community funds. If the other spouse were to die with a will leaving all property
over which he or she had testamentary power to children of a prior marriage, it would be almost
absurd for the law to recognize the legatees as owners of a half interest in the gold-infused dentures
affixed to the mouth of the surviving spouse, an outcome avoidable by application of the fixtures
doctrine.
49. See, e.g., Paine v. San Bernardino Valley Traction Co., 77 P. 659 (Cal. 1904); Henly v.
Wilson, 70 P. 21 (Cal. 1902).
50. See, e.g., Fredrickson & Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd, 102 P.2d 627, 628-29 (Nev. 1940).
51. 1902 La. Acts 68, amending article 2402 of the Louisiana Civil Code to add the following
exception to the basic definition of community property:
But damages resulting from personal injuries to the wife shall not form part of this
community, but shall always be and remain the separate property of the wife and
recoverable by herself alone; "provided where the injuries sustained by the wife result in
her death, the right to recover damages shall be as now provided for by existing laws."
52. Picheloup v. Gibbons, 120 So. 504, 504-05 (La. Ct. App. 1928). A Texas court made a
similar miraculous interpretation of a statute dealing with classification of components of a recovery
based on a married person's personal injuries. First enacted in 1968, what is now section 3.001(3) of
the Texas Family Code provides that separate property of a husband or wife includes "the recovery
for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning
capacity," quoted in Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 391 n.1 (Tex. 1972), from former section
5.01 of the Texas Family Code-which was repealed in 1997 and itself was formerly article 4651 of
the Texas Civil Statutes. Notwithstanding the plain legislative choice not to make an exception to
the basic rule classifying the damages as separate property for the amount of recovery based on
medical expenses incurred, Graham held: "To the extent that the marital partnership has incurred
medical or other expenses and has lost wages, both spouses have been damaged by the injury to the
spouse ... . The recovery, therefore, is community in character." Id. at 396.
53. Simon v. Harrison, 200 So. 476, 479 (La. Ct. App. 1941).
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be traced to a "right violated"-a right to personal security-that was
separate property of the victim-spouse.54
Since these new approaches were few in number and not tied to
California law, it is not surprising that in 1922 a California intermediate
appellate court addressed the issue of classifying a married person's
wrongful death recovery in the same manner in which the McFadden court
in 1891 had dealt with damages for injury to a wife's womb. The case was
Keena v. United Railroads of San Francisco" and involved a four-year- and
eight-month-old boy who was struck by the defendant's cable car and died
from his injuries.56 The decedent's father brought a wrongful death suit
alleging negligence by the railroad. The railroad pleaded, as a defense, that
the child's mother had been contributorily negligent by allowing the boy to
play on the street without reasonable supervision. Judgment for the
plaintiff father was reversed due to errors in jury instructions relating to
contributory negligence.
In a rehearing petition, the plaintiff father urged that the mother's
contributory negligence was not an issue because the father alone had been
awarded damages and they were his separate property; as a result, the wife
could not benefit from her own wrong as she arguably would if the damages
recovered were community property.60  The court of appeal rejected the
assertion that a married claimant's wrongful death damages should be
classified as separate property:
In this state a father may maintain an action for an injury to, or the
death of, a minor child. Code Civ. Proc. § 376. The mother, having
an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief
demanded, may be joined as a plaintiff. Code Civ. Proc. § 378.
54. See GEORGE MCKAY, A Cause ofAction for an Injury to Separate Property, or for Violation
of a Separate Right Is Separate, in A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY FOR
ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, IDAHO, LOUISIANA, NEVADA, NEW MEXIco, TEXAS, AND WASHINGTON (1st
ed. 1910). "The cause of action takes the same character as the right violated . . . ." Id. § 78, at 163.
"Upon principle it would seem that the right violated should determine whether the right to recover
is separate, or community property." Id. § 180, at 247. But McKay conceded that all the reported
cases then on point held that personal injury recoveries by a spouse could not be traced to a separate
property source, such as a separate right. Id. § 181, at 248.
55. 207 P. 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922).
56. Id. at 36.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 37-38.
60. Id.
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The proceeds of a favorable judgment in such an action become
community property. Civ. Code §§ 163, 164, and 687.61
In reaching this conclusion, the court did not cite any precedent but, as the
court did in McFadden, relied on what was then California Civil Code
section 163's definition of the husband's separate property as limited to
assets coming to him "by gift, bequest, devise, or descent" if the acquisition
was during marriage.62 The wrongful death cause of action the husband
brought in Keena did not meet this definition's test. In denying a hearing in
Keena, the California Supreme Court declared: "We approve of that portion
of the opinion [of the court of appeal] holding that the proceeds of the
judgment in favor of the father is community property . . ."63
B. Subsequent California Decisions Consistent with Keena
Keena was followed in 1935 by another terse holding that "[t]he
proceeds of a favorable judgment in an action brought by a father [for
wrongful death of a child] are community property... ."--citing only
Keena.64 Three courts of appeal decisions in the 1960s similarly applied this
61. Id. at 38.
62. Former section 687 of the California Civil Code, relied on by the Keena court as well as
section 163, provided in 1922: "Community property is property acquired by husband and wife, or
either, during marriage, when not acquired as the separate property of either or as common or joint
property of both." Former section 687 was enacted as part of the California Civil Code of 1872.
63. Keena, 207 P. at 38. This comment by the California Supreme Court was elicited by its
disagreement with a passage in the opinion of the court of appeal in Keena in which that court held
that the wrongful death damages were community property and stated: "[T]he proceeds of such a
judgment passed to the surviving husband and wife, one moiety to each." Id. The common law term
"moiety" described the equal shares of co-owners in common law joint tenancy and the interests of
tenants in common having equal shares. Green v. Skinner, 197 P. 60, 61 (Cal. 1921) (surviving joint
tenant takes moiety of property held with deceased joint tenant not as successor to the latter but by
right created by the conveyance); Thompson v. Jones, 141 P. 366, 366 (Cal. 1914) ("[Bly this deed
the two became tenants in common of the land, each owning an undivided moiety thereof."). The
term "moiety" had no application to the civil law institution of community property. Indeed, in 1922
when hearing was denied in Keena, the California Supreme Court was still adhering to its odd theory
that during marriage the husband had the entire ownership of community property (even the wife's
earnings), the wife having merely a non-proprietary expectancy that would ripen into ownership of
one half should she survive him. See Spreckles v. Spreckles, 158 P. 537, 539 (Cal. 1916).
Somehow, however, the wife's lack of ownership did not bar imputing her negligence to her
husband on the ground that she would benefit if he were permitted to obtain a community property
recovery. The statement by the court of appeal that the wife acquired a half interest in the damages
was inconsistent with the Spreckles theory that a wife had a mere expectancy in community
property. Perhaps more significantly, the notion that a half interest "passed" to the husband
himself-apparently directly and not derivatively based on his ownership interest in her
acquisitions-undercut the theoretical basis for imputing her negligence to him when he brought
suit. Thus, the California Supreme Court, in denying a hearing in Keena, concluded the sentence
that approved the community property classification of the damages (quoted in part above in text)
with these words: "[B]ut we disapprove of that portion of the opinion to the effect that the proceeds
of the judgment pass to the parents, one-half to each." Keena, 207 P. at 38.
64. Abos v. Martyn, 52 P.2d 987, 987-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935).
878
HeinOnline  -- 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 878 2011-2012
[Vol. 39: 865, 2012] California Wrongful Death Damages
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
rule without any analysis of why the money damages can be traced back to
the cause of action for wrongful death, but the cause of action itself cannot
be traced back to benefits the plaintiff-spouse was deprived of due to the
death of his or her relative.
In 1947 the California Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Tucker stated,
without any analysis, that "the proceeds of the judgment [for wrongful
death] are community property.",66 For this proposition Fuentes cited only
the California Supreme Court's comment in denying hearing in Keena and
the 1924 court of appeal decision in Sandberg v. McGilvray-Raymond
Granite Co.,67 discussed below, 68 which classified damages recovered by a
married person for wrongful death of a minor child as 100% community
property on a legal theory very different from that employed in Keena.
Five years later in Flores v. Brown,69 the California Supreme Court
again made a one-sentence pronouncement about classifying damages
recovered for wrongful death as separate or community property without any
explanation except for citations to Fuentes and Sandberg: "[I]t is settled that
a cause of action for injuries to either the husband and the wife arising
during marriage and while they are living together is community
property . . . , and the same rule is applicable to a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a minor child. . . ."'
It is clear that no California appellate court decision has specifically
considered why 100% of a married person's wrongful death recovery must
be community property and why there can be no tracing back to determine
what kind of loss forms the basis for the plaintiff-spouse's cause of action.
The specific issue apparently has never been presented to an appellate court
in California.
65. Casas v. Maulhardt Buick, Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 44, 51 n.6 (Ct. App. 1968); Premo v. Grigg, 46
Cal. Rptr. 683, 688 (Ct. App. 1965); Cervantes v. Maco Gas Co., 2 Cal. Rptr. 75, 77-78 (Ct. App.
1960).
66. Fuentes v. Tucker, 187 P.2d 752, 758 (Cal. 1947) (where two married couples sued for the
wrongful death of minor sons of each of them in consolidated actions).
67. 226 P. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924). See Fuentes, 187 P.2d at 758. Sandberg is discussed in
detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 74-116.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 71-96.
69. 248 P.2d 922 (Cal. 1952).
70. Id. at 926 (citations omitted).
879
HeinOnline  -- 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 879 2011-2012
IV. THE THEORY THAT A CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION COMPELLED
THE COURTS TO CLASSIFY SOME WRONGFUL DEATH RECOVERIES
AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY
A. The 1924 Sandberg Decision
In the 1924 Sandberg case 7 the eight-year-old son of Mr. and Mrs.
Sandberg died due to the defendant granite quarry operator's negligence in
maintaining an attractive nuisance.72 The boy's father was the sole plaintiff
in the wrongful death action, but the jury was instructed to determine the
pecuniary loss suffered by both the plaintiff and his wife, the mother of the
child. In its original opinion in the case, the California court of appeal held
that the jury instruction was proper because the recovery would be
community property, in which the mother had an interest, although the
property was subject to the management of her husband.74
The defendant filed a petition for rehearing, renewing its argument that
the jury should have been permitted to consider only damages to the
husband caused by the child's death, but on a new and quite extraordinary
theory.75 The rehearing petition conceded that the wrongful death cause of
action was community property. Notwithstanding this, the defendant
argued that Section 376, as worded at the time of the tort, made the damages
awarded to the plaintiff father his separate property. Dealing with recovery
for the wrongful death of a minor child, the defendant contended, Section
376 was "based upon the common law, not the civil law." 8 Since the statute
addressed "the common law remedies of a parent, . . . the legislature could
not in reason be supposed to have had the question of community property in
mind." 79 Thus, the father's recovery in Sandberg was said to be English
common law separate property even though the cause of action was
community property.
71. Sandberg, 226 P. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924).
72. Id. at 29.
73. Id. at 32.
74. Id (citing Keena v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 207 P. 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922)). See supra text
accompanying notes 61-64.
75. Sandberg, 226 P. at 32-33.
76. "It is quite true that the father's right of action for damages is community property (CC
164). So is the right of action of the mother (same section)." Appellants' Petition for a Rehearing at
13, Sandberg v. McGilvray-Raymond Granite Co., 226 P. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924) (No. 2707). At
this time Section 164 of the California Civil Code defined community property. CAL. CiV. CODE §
164 (1872) (current versions at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 700, 760, 803 (2004)).
77. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing, supra note 76, at 13.
78. Id. Apparently, the defendant forgot that "the right of action for wrongful death, not having
existed in the common law, is unqualifiedly statutory." Bayer v. Suttle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214 (Ct.
App. 1972) (internal quotations omitted).
79. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing, supra note 76, at 13-14.
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Not surprisingly, the court of appeal rejected this contention. In its
opinion denying the petition for rehearing, the court quoted the following
language of then Section 376 of the California Code of Civil Procedure:80
A father, or in case of his death or desertion of his family, the
mother, may maintain an action for the injury or death of a minor
child, and a guardian for the injury or death of his ward, when such
injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another. '
The intermediate appellate court conceded that it would be reasonable to
hold that words of Section 376 "in so far as they relate to parties plaintiff,
were intended to affect the procedure merely" 82 and would not implicitly
classify the damages recovered as community property-a substantive rather
than a procedural matter. The court might have added that the Civil Code
contained the statutes dealing with the classification of marital acquisitions
as community or separate property, and that one would not have expected
the legislature to have inserted into the Code of Civil Procedure substantive
rules defining community property. Nevertheless, the court held:
An examination of the provisions of section 376, viewed in the light
of the history of the legislation upon the subject-matter embraced
therein, discloses a legislative intent to give the marital community
a right of action for the death by wrongful act of a minor child.
What is recovered in such a case is community property and
therefore the husband, who has control of the community property,84
is authorized to maintain the action. If the community is destroyed
80. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 376 (West 1872).
81. Sandberg, 226 P. at 33 (internal quotations omitted).
82. Id. As stated in House v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 95 P.2d 465, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939),
overruled on another ground by Fuentes v. Tucker, 187 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1947): "The purpose of
section 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure was to designate the necessary party plaintiff in order
that a defendant might be protected against multiplicity of actions and that a finality of the litigation
might be assured." These are solely procedural purposes for this statute.
83. In 1924 several Civil Code sections could have been cited, including former sections 162,
163, 164, 169, and 687.
84. In California, wives had no management of any community property until 1951 with the
enactment of former Civil Code section 171c (enacted by 1951 Cal. Stat. 2860 and repealed in
1983), which gave wives control over their own uncommingled earnings. See William A. Reppy,
Jr., Retroactivity ofthe 1975 California Community Property Reforms, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 1053
(1975). By statutes enacted in 1891, 1901, and 1917, the wife did, however, have veto power over
the husband's attempts to make gifts of community property, to encumber or sell community
household furnishings, and to convey or encumber community realty. Id.
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by the death or desertion of the husband, then the wife may sue....
[S]ection 376, in so far as it authorizes the husband to maintain an
action for the death of a minor child, is framed upon the theory of
the continuance of the marital community and that the husband is
the representative thereof for the purpose of maintaining the action.
There was no necessity of joining the wife as a party plaintiff.85
B. Sandberg Was Erroneously Decided
1. Section 376 of the California Code of Civil Procedure Dealt
Only with Procedural Matters
The notion that, under Section 376, when a child of the marriage was
tortiously killed, the father/husband alone was the proper plaintiff meant that
recovery would be community property, subject at the time to his exclusive
management, may have had some initial appeal; but a closer examination
indicates that the theory that the statute includes a directive to classify the
recovery as community property is unsound. Suppose the child was killed
after the child's parents were divorced based on the wife's adultery.8 The
father had never deserted the mother, and his child (the "family" under
Section 376) and was not dead, so Section 376 made him alone the proper
plaintiff.87 Yet, because he was not married to the mother at the time the
wrongful death cause of action arose, the recovery could not by any logic be
community property, as without a marriage there is no community.
Moreover, if the legislature's designation of the father as the proper
plaintiff in certain circumstances evinced an intent to have courts classify the
damages recovered in a wrongful death suit as community property, then the
statute's making the mother the proper plaintiff in all other circumstances
must likewise implicitly carry with it an intent regarding classification of the
damages she might recover. It seems clear from the Sandberg court's
comment that the wife is entitled to be the plaintiff only after the community
has been "destroyed" that Sandberg had concluded the legislative intent in
enacting Section 376 was to classify the recovery as the wife's separate
85. Sandberg, 226 P. at 33.
86. In 1939, Section 376 was amended to delete reference to the father's desertion of his wife
and to provide instead that the action for wrongful death of a minor child should be brought by the
"father of a minor, or if the father is dead or the parents of said minor are living separate or apart
and the mother of the minor then has care or custody ofsaid minor, then the mother...." 1939 Cal.
Stat. 1759 (emphasis added). Wexler v. City ofLos Angeles, 243 P.2d 868, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952),
assumed that the reference to parents "living separate or apart" included parents who had been
divorced before the death of the minor child. Notwithstanding Wexler's creative holding, it seems
impossible that the pre-1939 language of Section 376 referring to desertion of the husband could
have been construed to include the situation where the parents were divorced at the time of the tort
although the husband had never deserted the wife.
87. See CIV. § 376.
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property when she was the plaintiff." In a situation where the husband
deserted his wife and child and days later the child was tortiously killed,
there would seem to be serious doubts about the constitutionality of equating
the father's desertion of the family to the severing of the husband-father's
parental relationship to the child without any hearing to examine the reason
for such desertion.89 Sandberg implies that, because the mother is made the
plaintiff, any recovery is her separate property, and the father has suffered
no loss from the death of his child-a forfeiture similar to a decree cutting
off his paternal rights. Courts decline to give an interpretation to a statute
that renders it unconstitutional or even raises grave doubts concerning its
constitutionality, when the wording thereof does not demand such an
interpretation. 90 Certainly Section 376 as worded in 1924 was susceptible to
the interpretation that it dealt solely with procedural issues and did not
extend to substantive definitions of community and separate property. 91
2. Sandberg Misunderstood the Living-Apart Doctrine
The Sandberg court was also just wrong in stating that desertion by the
husband destroyed the community.92 Even assuming the desertion referred
to in Section 376 as worded in 1924 was a desertion the husband intended to
be a permanent, "complete and final break in the marital relationship""9 so
88. Sandberg, 226 P. at 33.
89. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
These cases establish that even a biological father who was never married to the mother has a
relationship interest with their non-marital child with whom he has established a parental
relationship, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), that is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the federal Constitution, at least where no other male has a claim as father. See
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
90. See People v. Superior Court, 917 P.2d 628, 633 (Cal. 1996) (quoting Miller v. Mun. Court,
142 P.2d 297, 303 (Cal. 1943)):
"If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional
and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful
constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing
violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its
entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction
is equally reasonable."
Accord Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000) ("'[W]here a statute is susceptible of two
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of
which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter."' The Court in Jones was quoting
United States ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909).).
91. See discussion supra pp. 881-82.
92. Sandberg, 226 P. at 33.
93. Baragry v. Baragry (In re Marriage of Baragry), 140 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (Ct. App. 1977)
(construing "living separate and apart" in former section 5118 of the California Civil Code, the
successor to Civil Code section 169, the living-apart statute enacted in 1872 and in effect in 1924
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that a court would hold that the couple were "living separate" under the text
of former California Civil Code section 169, then in effect,94 the legal result
would have been that the wife's earnings and accumulations were her
separate property, while those of the husband acquired while living separate
and apart from her were community property" in which the wife had an
interest, precluding any conclusion that the community had been
"destroyed" or otherwise had ceased to exist.96
when Sandberg was decided). Today the living-apart statute, Family Code section 771, is gender
neutral so that the husband's earnings-not just those of the wife as under the statute in effect in
1924-during such a period of separation are separate property. Bouquet v. Bouquet (In re Marriage
of Bouquet), 546 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Cal. 1976), held that the version of the statute in effect in 1924
that benefitted only the wife was "patently unfair" due to gender discrimination and permitted
application of the gender-neutral version of the statute in effect at the time of divorce in Bouquet to
the husband's acquisitions while living separate and apart from the wife and prior to enactment of
the gender-neutral text, resulting in the wife being stripped of her community interest in such
earnings, an outcome that the Bouquet court considered to involve retroactive application of the
gender-neutral statute. Note also that, at the time of the death of their child due to a tortfeasor's
negligence, the parents, husband and wife, could be living separate and apart, each believing their
marriage was completely a dead letter, not due to desertion of the husband but rather by agreement
of the spouses, perhaps an agreement following the wife's initial suggestion that they should
permanently separate (perhaps for religious reasons they also agreed not to divorce). Under the
passage from Sandberg quoted in text, there being no desertion by, or death of, the father, he would
be the proper plaintiff to sue, and all the recovery would be community property, depriving the wife
of her claim under section 169 of the California Civil Code, as worded in 1924, that damages she
suffered should be her separate property. Since Sandberg looked to section 376 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure for legislative direction concerning classification of a wrongful death
recovery, the wife's invoking of section 169 of the Civil Code would have had to have been rejected.
Id See also Espinosa v. Haslam, 47 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935), where the husband and
wife separated and the husband provided a home for his son, who decided at age eighteen to leave
his father and move in with his mother, with whom he was living when at age twenty he was
tortiously killed (having the status of a minor child under California law at this time). The court held
that the father was entitled to sue for wrongful death under Section 376 because he had provided a
home and support for the son, and thus there had been no "desertion of his family" (the Section 376
language) by the father. Under Sandberg, all the recovery would be community property even
though the wife was living separate and apart from the husband and would be invoking (without
success) Civil Code section 169.
94. As enacted in 1872, section 169 of the California Civil Code in 1922 provided: "The
earnings and accumulations of the wife, and of her minor children living with her or in her custody,
while she is living separate from her husband, are the separate property of the wife." Current
version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 771 (West 2004).
95. See Randolph v. Randolph, 258 P.2d 547, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); see also Brown v.
Brown, 147 P. 1168, 1169-70 (Cal. 1915) (husband's earnings during pendency of divorce action
were community property).
96. See supra text accompanying note 85. Even under the present gender-neutral living apart
statute, section 771 of the California Family Code, the community is not "destroyed" even though
earnings and accumulations of each spouse after the separation are the separate property of each
acquiring party. Pre-separation community capital remains community property and will produce
community-owned dividends, interest, and rentals. Such acquisitions are not the "accumulations" of
either the separated husband or the separated wife but rather are the fruits of the community capital.
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C. A 1950 Decision Implicitly Rejects Sandberg
Christiana v. Rose,9" a 1950 decision by the California court of appeal,
is inconsistent with Sandberg's suggestion that, if Section 376 names the
mother as the appropriate plaintiff for a suit arising from the wrongful death
of a minor child, all recovery must be her separate property and there can be
no community property recovery based on damages suffered by the
father/husband. The cause of action in Christiana arose after a 1939
amendment to Section 376 deleted reference to desertion of the family by
the father and provided instead that the mother was the proper plaintiff when
"the parents of said [deceased] minor are living separate or apart and the
mother of the minor then has care or custody of said minor,"98 as was the
fact pattern in Christiana." While an action to dissolve her marriage was
pending, the wife sued the tortfeasor for wrongful death of the child of the
marriage, proved only her own damages, and obtained a judgment upon
which she collected.'o After the divorce became final-it made no division
of any community property-the father sued the ex-wife for half of the
damages she had collected on the ground they were community property not
distributed at their divorce, so that he owned half as a tenant in common.'0'
The court heldl02 that Section 376 gave the wife standing to sue as
heirl03 and that former California Civil Code section 169, the living-apart
statute, made her recovery separate property,104 and it stressed that her proof
of damages at trial dealt solely with loss to her and not with loss suffered by
97. 222 P.2d 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
98. 1939 Cal. Stat. 1759.
99. Christiana, 222 P.2d at 892.
100. Id. at 892-93.
101. Id. at 893.
102. The court declared that its theory that the wife's recovery was her separate property was
actually an "alternative" holding and that it was also affirming the judgment that the father take
nothing in his action against the ex-wife on the trial court's reasoning that her recovery had been
community property and that the father was estopped by his actions during the prior divorce trial
from claiming a former community interest. Id. at 892-96. Obviously, the recovery cannot be both
separate property and community property, so one of the so-called alternative holdings has to be
legally wrong. Christiana has been subsequently cited for the holding that the wife's recovery was
separate property as an "accumulation[]" under the living-apart statute, now codified at section 771
of the California Family Code. Wall v. Wall (In re Marriage of Wall), 105 Cal. Rptr. 201, 203
(1972). Courts should ignore the portion of Christiana that assumed a separated wife's recovery in
the 1940s for wrongful death of a child of hers and her husband's could be community property due
to Section 376.
103. Christiana, 222 P.2d at 895.
104. Id. at 897.
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the father.'os Nevertheless, the court said that the father "could, and perhaps
should, have been joined as a plaintiff or defendant in the wrongful death
action." 06 Under section 169 as then worded, had he been made a party and
proved his own loss arising out of the death of his child, the father's
recovery would have been community property. This is inconsistent with
the apparent teaching of Sandberg that, in a fact situation where Section 376
declares the mother as a proper plaintiff, that designation carries with it the
rule that all recovery is her separate property. 07
D. Statutory Changes Abrogated the Sandberg Holding
Sandberg was an erroneous decision. Although it was twice cited by the
California Supreme Court without explanation as to why,0 8 it seems likely
that the supreme court was approving merely the result-that the damages
recovered there by the father-husband for wrongful death of a minor child,
occurring when the spouses were not living separate and apart were
community property-and that the supreme court did not intend to approve
Sandberg's reasoning that Section 376 as worded in 1924 contained
provisions classifying wrongful death recoveries by married persons as
105. Id at 896. The mother ought to have been able to prove that the deceased child had
regularly given substantial gifts each year jointly to her and her husband-his father. A gift to a
cohabiting husband and wife in equal shares is probably community property under California law.
See Gonzales v. Gonzales (In re Marriage of Gonzales), 172 Cal. Rptr. 179, 182-84 (Ct. App. 1981);
see also Fuller v. Ferguson, 26 Cal. 546, 565-66 (1864) (stating, in a discussion of Mexican law in
effect in California before it was acquired by the United States that a lucrative acquisition by
husband and wife jointly during marriage is community property); Scott v. Ward, 13 Cal. 458, 469
(1859) (also discussing Spanish and Mexican law in effect, which required that "property acquired
by the husband and wife during the marriage, and whilst living together, whether by onerous or
lucrative title . . . belong[s] to the community"). The influential Washington case so holding, In re
Estate of Salvini, 397 P.2d 811, 814 (Wash. 1964), should be persuasive. But see Andrews v.
Andrews, 186 P.2d 744, 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (finding that a gift during marriage by the
husband's aunt to the husband and wife was held in tenancy in common. But the issue litigated was
not whether it was community property as opposed to tenancy in common property owned in equal
shares, but whether both spouses were the donee or just the husband alone). If the trier of fact in
Christiana were to find by inference that the decedent, had he not been killed, would have continued
making such gifts even after his parents separated, half the amount of such future gifts that could not
be made due to the tortiously-caused death of the donor child would be the separate property of the
plaintiff-mother due to applicability of the living-apart statute (which then benefitted only wives)
and would be part of her wrongful death damages. Although she would have had standing to prove
the loss of the total gifts that could not be made in order to have her half factored into her damages,
she would not have had standing to collect in her wrongful death suit the community one-half of the
gift that would have been made post-separation to her husband, as he was the sole manager of the
community at the time and the proper plaintiff to recover such a loss.
106. Christiana, 222 P.2d at 896. It was subsequently established that in this fact situation, the
plaintiff-mother's failure to join the father as a party to the wrongful death suit gave the father a
cause of action for damages against the mother. See Hall v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 806,
812 (Ct. App. 2003) (following Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78 (Ct. App. 1997)).
107. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 69-70.
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community or separate property.109 Surely approval of no more than the
result in Sandberg was the basis for the California Supreme Court's first
citation of that case in Fuentes v. Tucker"o because that citation was coupled
with one to Keena, where the reasoning behind the community property
classification-resting on the Civil Code sections defining community and
separate property, and not on Code of Civil Procedure Section 376"'-was
inconsistent with the Sandberg opinion." 2
In any event, Sandberg surely was legislatively abrogated in 1949, when
Section 376 was amended to address only suits based on injury to a minor
child, not death of the child, and former California Code of Civil Procedure
section 377 was amended to provide, in the pertinent part:
When the death of a ... minor person who leaves surviving him
either a ... father or mother . .. is caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another, his heirs . .. may maintain an action for damages
against the person causing the death . ... The respective rights of
the heirs in any award shall be determined by the court."13
Today, no section of the California Code of Civil Procedure deals
specifically with the wrongful death of a minor child. Section 377.60,
entitled "Persons with standing," says that when a relative has been
tortiously killed, an action for wrongful death "may be asserted" by the
decedent's intestate heirs if the decedent leaves no issue.1 14 Section 377.61
is, today, similar to the final sentence quoted from the 1949 revision: "The
court shall determine the respective rights in an award of the persons entitled
to assert the cause of action.""' If the plaintiff is a married person and the
issue arises as to whether the recovery is community or separate property or
both, this statute should be viewed as referring the court to the Family Code
provisions defining separate and community property"'6 and to judicial
decisions dealing with principles of tracing marital property through changes
in form or to a source associated with the occurrence of a loss.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
110. See supra text accompanying note 67.
111. See supra text accompanying note 63.
112. See supra text accompanying note 66.
113. 1949 Cal. Stat. 2401-02.
114. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West 2004).
115. Id. § 377.61.
116. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 760, 770 (West 2004).
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V. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTURE FROM THE MCFADDEN RULE
THAT ALL COMPONENTS OF A PERSONAL INJURY RECOVERY BY A
NON-SEPARATED MARRIED PERSON MUST BE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
A. The Nevada Supreme Court Rejects McFadden's Limitation on Tracing
The first judicial departure from the rule of California's McFadden
decision that a damages award based on personal injuries to a married
person could be traced to the cause of action on which it was based, but not
further back as, for example, to the body of the spouse that was damaged,
came from the Nevada Supreme Court in 1940. In Fredrickson & Watson
Construction Co. v. Boyd,'" the trial court had refused to instruct the jury in
a wife's personal injury case that her husband's contributory negligence
could be imputed to her, and the Nevada Supreme Court said it should have
been so instructed if her recovery was community property."'
But the Nevada Supreme Court held that trial court did not err because
the damages to be recovered by the wife would be her separate property." 9
"[T]he judgment takes its character from the right violated, namely, the right
of personal security."l 20  The court stressed that this "said right, the wife
brings to the marriage."'21
117. 102 P.2d 627 (Nev. 1940).
118. Id. at 628.
119. Id
120. Id at 629.
121. Id The court also quoted from GEORGE MCKAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 398, at 296 (2d ed. 1925), which had asserted that the husband does not "'hold the
wife's right to personal security and should not be permitted to recover for the violation of this right.
It does not belong to him nor to the community. The wife 's physical pain and suffering are not his
loss nor the loss of the community."' Fredrickson, 102 P.2d at 629 (emphasis added); see also supra
note 54. The Nevada Supreme Court's use of this quotation suggests that the damages to the wife in
Fredrickson consisted only of compensation for pain and suffering and did not extend to lost
earnings or even reimbursement for medical bills incurred, as the community would have a claim to
those components under McKay's analysis. Nevertheless the Nevada Supreme Court declared
without express qualification that "the judgment and proceeds flowing therefrom" were the wife's
separate property. Fredrickson, 102 P.2d at 629. In Choate v. Ransom, 323 P.2d 700, 702 (Nev.
1958) (emphasis added), the court said Fredrickson "held that a recovery by a married person for
personal injuries is the separate property of that person." The Nevada Supreme Court has never
considered whether it would follow the lead of subsequent decisions in other states-cited in the
next paragraph of this footnote-that classify the lost earnings and medical bill components of the
recovery as community property. In 1975 the Nevada legislature amended section 123.130 of the
Nevada Revised Statutes to provide in subdivision (1) that "[a]ll property of the wife owned by her
before marriage, and that acquired by her afterwards . . . by an award for personal injury
damages ... is her separate property." Subdivision (2) of this statute makes the same provision for
Nevada husbands. Query if the Nevada Supreme Court will view this statute as barring it from
holding that so much of the recovery as is based on lost earnings during marriage and on medical
bills incurred during marriage should be classified as community property. Recall that Louisiana
appellate courts did not feel so restricted by a similar statute enacted in that state. See supra notes
51-53 and accompanying text.
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B. California Courts Consider the Nevada Approach to Classification of
Personal Injury Damages Recovered by a Married Person
In 1947, one dissenting justice on the California Supreme Court adopted
the Nevada Supreme Court's holding in Fredrickson, as applied to damages
awarded a married person for pain, suffering, and disfigurement.122  This
justice would have overruled the dictate of McFadden that the majority in
the 1947 case fully approved.12 3
1. Death of the Non-Victim Spouse Held to Make McFadden
Inapplicable
Five years later, however, in Flores v. Brown,124 the California Supreme
Court, without dissent on this point, seemed to concede the illogic of the
McFadden mandate for classifying not only all the components of a spouse's
personal injury recovery as community property, but also his or her recovery
for the wrongful death of a minor child. In a single accident, the
contributorily negligent husband and a minor child of the marriage were
killed and the wife was badly injured.125 The wife sued the driver of the
other vehicle, asserting, inter alia, causes of action for her own personal
injuries and for the wrongful death of her minor son.126  Because the
husband's death in the accident had dissolved the marriage and the
community, the California Supreme Court held, "[T]he interests in any of
these causes of action become separate property, and it becomes possible to
segregate the elements of damages that would, except for the community
property system, be considered personal to each spouse."2 ' Surely the court
had in mind at least pain and suffering damages in referring to an
"element[]" of the wife's recovery that is as a matter of logic "personal" to
Other states followed Nevada in holding that a spouse's pain and suffering damages should
be judicially classified as the victim's separate property. See Brown v. Brown (In re Marriage of
Brown), 675 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1984); Jurek v. Jurek, 606 P.2d 812 (Ariz. 1980); Rogers v.
Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566 (Idaho 1974); Soto v. Vandeventer, 245 P.2d 826 (N.M. 1952).
122. Zaragosa v. Craven, 202 P.2d 73, 78 (Cal. 1947) (Carter, J., dissenting); see also Kesler v.
Pabst, 273 P.2d 257, 260-63 (Cal. 1954) (Carter, J., dissenting).
123. Zaragosa, 202 P.2d at 76-77 ("[T]he cause of action for personal injuries suffered by either
spouse . . . as well as any recovery therefore, constitutes community property." (citing CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 162-164, 687 (current versions at CAL. FAM. CODE § 780 (West 1992)))).
124. 248 P.2d 922 (Cal. 1952). For a fuller discussion of Flores, see William A. Reppy, Jr., The
Effect of the Adoption of Comparative Negligence on California Community Property Law: Has
Imputed Negligence Been Revived?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1366-68 (1977).
125. Flores, 248 P.2d at 923.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 926 (emphasis added).
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her. The "community property system" in California was not based on a
universal community, rather, it recognized the existence of separate property
during the marriage, and it had been settled that separately owned assets
brought to the marriage could produce mutations that were likewise separate
based on principles of tracing.12 8 Thus, Flores made no sense in asserting
that the existence of such a "system" made it impossible to "segregate" the
pain-and-suffering component of a spouse's personal injury recovery in
order to classify it as the victim's separate property except due to
recognition that precedents like McFadden were to be found in the reports of
decisions which the court was unwilling to overrule.
With respect to the damages that can be awarded to a spouse or to
spouses for the wrongful death of a minor child, the Flores court stated:
"Damages for wrongful death are the sum of those suffered by each heir or
parent."l2 9 This seemed to recognize that the damages each parent suffers
when both seek an award of damages will not be the same in amount, and
thus each claim is based on a personal loss.o3 0 If so, the award should not be
community property, which treats each spouse as co-equal owners of a half
interest in each asset so classified.131
2. Post-Injury Divorce Renders McFadden Inapplicable
Four years later, the California Supreme Court's opinion in Washington
v. Washington'32 confirmed that Flores should be read as expressing
disenchantment with the McFadden approach to classification. In
Washington a husband was tortiously injured during.marriage but did not
obtain a judgment for damages until after divorce. The issue was whether
the damages were traceable to a community property cause of action,
making the ex-wife co-owner of the damages. The court rejected this
view and said:
128. See, e.g., Dimmick v. Dimmick, 30 P. 547, 548 (Cal. 1892) (property brought into a
marriage may maintain its status as separate property if it can be clearly traced, even if it undergoes
mutations); see also supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
129. Flores, 248 P.2d at 927 (emphasis added). For purposes of calculating damages for
wrongful death, the quoted passage treats the mother and father of the decedent the same as a son
and a daughter of the decedent who might, as "heir[s]" of the decedent, be the plaintiffs in the
wrongful death suit. See id. It could not be contended that the awards to such a son and daughter
would have to be equal in amount.
130. See id.
131. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (West 1994) (interests of husband and wife in community
property are "equal interests"; CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(a) (West 2002) (each spouse owns an
"undivided one-half interest in the community" property)); People v. Lockett, 102 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44
(Ct. App. 1972) (wife owns "one half of her husband['s] ... earnings").
132. 302 P.2d 569 (Cal. 1956).
133. Id. at 569-70.
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A rule permitting apportionment of the damages . .. has never been
adopted in this state, and in the absence thereof, treating the entire
cause of action as community property protects the community
interests in the elements that clearly should belong to it. . . .[134]
Although such a rule may be justified when it appears that the
marriage will continue, it loses its force when the marriage is
dissolved after the cause of action accrues. In such a case not only
may the personal elements of damage such as past pain and
suffering be reasonably treated as belonging to the injured party, but
the damages for future pain and suffering, future expenses, and
future loss of earnings are clearly attributable to him as a single
person following the divorce.135
The ex-wife in Washington had sued the tort victim, her former husband,
seeking a division of the personal injury damages he had recovered after
their divorce. 136 Based on the above-quoted passage, she should have had a
sound claim to half of the damages recovered by the ex-husband for lost
earnings during marriage and to half of his recovery based on medical bills
134. I suggest the "elements" that the court has in mind here are lost earnings during marriage
and cohabitation and reimbursement for medical bills incurred during marriage and cohabitation.
135. Id. at 571 (emphasis added). The holding that divorce converts a personal injury cause of
action arising out of a tort occurring when the spouses were cohabiting from community property to
the separate property of the victim-spouse is no longer good law. Section 2603 of the California
Family Code currently provides that damages for personal injuries "to be received" after divorce are
community property if the cause of action arose during marriage and before a permanent separation
of the spouses; but, the damages are a special type of community property not subject to the 50-50
division rule at divorce which, instead, may be awarded entirely to the victim-spouse by the divorce
court according to guidelines laid out in the statute. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2603 (West 1994); see also
infra note 148.
The supreme court in the above-quoted text has said that the Washington rule that the
personal injury cause of action is converted from community property to the victim-spouse's
separate property applies when the marriage is "dissolved" after the injury is suffered but before a
judgment awarding damages has been entered. Washington, 302 P.2d at 571. The death of the non-
victim-spouse would "dissolve" the marriage just as would a divorce decree. The dictum that such a
death converts the cause of action to the surviving victim-spouse's separate property may or may not
have been abrogated by the subsequent enactment of section 780 of the California Family Code
(quoted infra at note 147), which classifies the cause of action as community property if it arose
during marriage and while the spouses were cohabiting. CAL. FAM. CODE § 780 (West 1994).
Section 780 contains no qualifying language indicating that the legislature thought about how long
the community classification it mandated should endure and whether courts would have the power to
terminate the community classification that section 780 initially attaches to the cause of action based
on subsequent events, such as death of the non-victim-spouse. Id.
136. Washington, 302 P.2d at 569.
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incurred during marriage. But the Washington court gave her nothing.137 It
held: "Since we have no rule permitting the apportionment of the elements
of a cause of action for personal injuries between the spouses' separate and
community interests and since such a cause of action is not assignable, it
must vest in the injured party on the dissolution of the marriage."'
It is important to recall that the strange judicially-imposed legal barrier
to apportionment does not apply when the recovery is not for personal
injuries but for wrongful death of a relative. By statute, "[a] cause of
action" 39 can be asserted in one lawsuit by multiple relatives, such as by the
decedent's spouse along with multiple children of the decedent.' 40 Although
all the heirs must assert their claims in a single lawsuit, those claims are not
equal in value.141 California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.61142
directs the wrongful death court to apportion the damages into appropriate
shares for each co-plaintiff, a rule that would apply when the plaintiffs were
husband and wife, the parents of the decedent.
137. Id This was not based on the theory that she waived the claim by not asking the divorce
court to award her a community interest in the husband's post-divorce recovery. Id. at 571. The
Washington court indicated that the wife ought to have asked for an alimony award at divorce to
make up for her being cut out of the tort award to the husband as his separate property for his lost
earnings during marriage. Id.
138. Id. Query if the court would have been willing to classify the cause of action as 100% the
separate property of the victim-husband if analysis of the basis for his tort claim recovery made it
clear that only five percent of the total damages awarded were for pain and suffering and the great
bulk of the award was based on evidence of a major loss of earnings prior to divorce and extensive
medical bills paid before the divorce. Washington arose at a time that the living-separate-and-apart
statute did not apply to husbands. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
139. This term is used in section 377.60 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, but the
concept is more technical than that suggests. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West 2005). For
some purposes, such as calculating the statute of limitations separately for each heir entitled to sue,
the cases view each heir as having a distinct cause of action. See Cross v. Pac. Gas & Electric Co.,
388 P.2d 353, 354 (Cal. 1964) (viewing each heir as having a distinct cause of action). But the heirs
must sue together, and the damage awarded by the jury must be in a lump sum even though multiple
heirs each make proof of losses pertaining only to the heir submitting such evidence. E.g., San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 726 (Ct. App. 2007).
140. Civ. PROC. § 377.60(a).
141. See, e.g., Corder v. Corder, 161 P.3d 172 (Cal. 2007) (affirming division of wrongful death
settlement under section 377.61 of the California Code of Civil Procedure that accorded ten percent
to decedent's wife and ninety percent to decedent's daughter); Cate v. Fresno Traction Co., 2 P.2d
364 (Cal. 1931) ($1 to decedent's estranged husband, $5000 to each of her four children-
apportioned under former section 377 of the Califomia Code of Civil Procedure); Bartolozzi v.
Mallegni (In re Riccomi's Estate), 197 P. 97 (Cal. 1921) (15/16 to wife, 1/16 to mother, although
both were heirs to half of decedent's intestate estate-divided under former section 377).
142. Section 377.61 provides:
In an action under this article [concerning wrongful death suits], damages may be
awarded that, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just, but may not include
damages recoverable under Section 377.34 [governing damages the decedent suffered
before dying]. The court shall determine the respective rights in an award of the persons
entitled to assert the cause of action.
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C. McFadden Is Legislatively Abrogated
A year after Washington, the California legislature enacted former Civil
Code section 163.5, which provided: "All damages, special and general,
awarded a married person in a civil action for personal injuries, are the
separate property of such married person."1 43  From 1960 to 1968, the
California courts of appeal three times construed "personal injuries" in this
statute as not extending to damages sought by a married parent for wrongful
death of a child.144 The second of these decisions stated that in section 163.5
"[t]he Legislature did not mention damage suffered by the spouses as parents
from the wrongful death of a child." 4 5
D. The Legislature Revives McFaddenfor Specific Fact Situations
Section 163.5 was repealed in 1969,146 superseded by former Civil Code
section 4800, applicable only at divorce, which provided in the pertinent
part:
Community property personal injury damages shall be assigned to
the party who suffered the injuries unless the court ... determines
that the interests of justice require another disposition . . . . As used
in this section, "community property personal injury damages"
means all money or other property received by a married person as
community property[147] in satisfaction of a judgment for damages
143. 1957 Cal. Stat. 4066 (emphasis added).
144. Casas v. Maulhardt Buick, Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 44, 51 n.6 (Ct. App. 1968); Premo v. Grigg, 46
Cal. Rptr. 683, 688 (Ct. App. 1965); Cervantes v. Maco Gas Co., 2 Cal. Rptr. 75, 78 (Ct. App.
1960). In each case, alleged contributory negligence of one of the parents of the decedent was an
issue, and each court held the defense could be asserted because the damages recovered by the non-
negligent sponse/parent would be community property.
145. Premo, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
146. 1969 Cal. Stat. 3313.
147. "[R]eceived . .. as community property" indicates the legislature thought that with its repeal
of section 163.5 the California courts would revert to McFadden and resume classifying all elements
of personal injury damages-where the injury occurred during marriage and before a final
separation-as community property. However, the language in the statute did not compel such a
result, and the courts could have adopted the nation-wide majority rule that, while damages for lost
earnings during marriage and medical bills arising during marriage were community property, pain
and suffering damages were the victim-spouse's separate property. That approach recognizes some
personal injury damages that are community property and would not have rendered the new section
4800 inoperable. The present statute concerning division at divorce of personal injury damages,
Family Code section 2603, does not defer to the courts to classify the components of a recovery but
defines the property that is to be divided in the same manner as under former section 4800 as
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for his or her personal injuries or pursuant to an agreement for the
148
settlement or compromise of a claim for such damages ....
The term "personal injury damages" in the 1969 statute is almost identical to
"damages ... for personal injuries" in section 163.5, which had been
repeatedly construed to exclude damages for wrongful death recovered by a
married person.149 This made the following rule applicable:
"'[w]here . .. legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent
statute on the same or an analogous subject uses identical or substantially
similar language, [courts] presume that the Legislature intended the same
all money or other property received or to be received by a person in satisfaction of a
judgment for damages for the person's personal injuries or pursuant to an agreement for
the settlement or compromise of a claim for the damages, if the cause of action for the
damages arose during the marriage . . . [and before separation].
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2603 (West 2006). "All money" would have to include the pain and suffering
component of an award of damages. Thus, as of 1994, a statute precludes the California Supreme
Court from overruling McFadden and its ilk by providing that the pain and suffering component of a
recovery of damages for personal injuries is the victim-spouse's separate property. See 1992 Cal.
Stat. 490. In Part 2 of Division 4 of the Family Code, entitled "Characterization of Marital
Property," section 780 of the California Family Code provides:
Except as provided in Section 781 [dealing with injuries suffered by a spouse living
separate and apart from the other spouse] and subject to the rules of allocation set forth in
Section 2603, money and other property received or to be received by a married person in
satisfaction of a judgment for damages for personal injuries, or pursuant to an agreement
for the settlement or compromise of a claim for such damages, is community property if
the cause of action for the damages arose during the marriage.
148. 1969 Cal. Stat. 3333. This part of former section 4800 of the California Civil Code was
renumbered as subsection (c) of the statute in 1970. 1970 Cal. Stat. 1726.
149. "Community property personal injury damages" was converted into "community estate
personal injury damages" when section 2603 of the California Family Code became effective in
1994. 1992 Cal. Stat. 533. As used in statutes in the Family Code, "Community estate includes both
community property and quasi-community property." CAL. FAM. CODE § 63 (internal quotations
omitted). An official comment by the California Law Revision Commission to section 2603
indicates the change was not substantive: "In the second sentence of subdivision (b), the former
reference to community 'property' personal injury damages has been changed to community 'estate'
personal injury damages for internal consistency." Family Code, 22 CLRC REP. 1, 259 (1992).
"Community estate" picks up personal injury damages that are quasi-community property acquired
during marriage while the spouses where domiciled in another state before taking up domicile in
California. Pre-1994 statutory law concerning quasi-community property would have caused such
damages to be treated the same as true community property. See Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897
(Cal. 1965), upholding as constitutional and applying California's second attempt to create a
category of quasi-community property in former Civil Code section 140.5, enacted in 1961, and
quoted at page 899, note 3. As a result, the trio of 1960 to 1968 decisions (see supra note 144 and
accompanying text) holding that damages for wrongful death recovered by a spouse were not
"personal injuries" of the spouse under former section 163.5 of the California Civil Code,
established the scope of "personal injuries" in today's Family Code section 2603. The courts are
therefore free, even at divorce, to classify a spouse's wrongful death damages as separate property,
wholly or in part, in an appropriate case.
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construction, unless a contrary intent clearly appears."'150  That is, the new
1969 statute did not deal at all with wrongful death damages.
With slight linguistic modification,' 5 1 the 1969 law remains in effect
today as Family Code section 2603152 and still applies only at divorce.
Section 2603 compels the divorce courts to refer to personal injury damages
as community property. However, due to a presumption in section 2603 that
the victim-spouse be awarded such assets, the courts do not treat such funds
as true community property which must be divided 50-50 between wife and
husband upon divorce,153 but treat the funds more like separate property.
However, section 2603 will have no bearing on whether the expansion of the
doctrine of in-lieu tracing-discussed below-will lead the California
Supreme Court to disapprove Keena and similar decisions when the issue is
classification of wrongful death damages received by a married person.
VI. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IN-LIEU TRACING THEORY IN CALIFORNIA
A. Dictum in a 1908 Decision
All of the earliest cases applying the theory of in-lieu tracing arose in a
context in which direct tracing 54 could have been employed so that the
consideration paid for the asset-separate or community-would control its
classification, but the court concluded that direct tracing would produce an
improper result."' In-lieu tracing was first alluded to in confusingly written
150. Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP, 152 P.3d 416, 418 (Cal. 2007) (quoting
Doner-Griswold v. See (Estate of Griswold), 24 P.3d 1191, 1197-98 (Cal. 2001)); accord O'Connor
v. Vill. Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427, 432 (Cal. 1983) (revision of statute retaining verbatim
passage that had been judicially construed "represents a legislative endorsement of [that]
interpretation"); Traverso v. People ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434, 439 (Ct. App.
1996) (legislative use of identical language that had been judicially interpreted incorporates that
interpretation).
151. See supra note 149.
152. See supra note 147.
153. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2004).
154. "Direct tracing" is a term used when the source of an acquisition-usually the consideration
paid for it-is proved in court and its community or separate nature fixes the separate or community
classification of the acquisition. See Murphy v. Murphy (Estate of Murphy), 544 P.2d 956, 964 (Cal.
1976) ("direct tracing to a separate property source"); Stoll v. Stoll (In re Marriage of Stoll), 74 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 506, 508 (Ct. App. 1998); Braud v. Braud (In re Marriage of Braud), 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179,
195 (Ct. App. 1996); Maggio v. Vahldieck (In re Estate of Luke), 240 Cal. Rptr. 84, 91 (Ct. App.
1987).
155. Whenever a court declines to classify an item of property acquired by a married person
based on the community or separate character of funds or other property or labor used to acquire the
asset but reaches a different classification result by use of in-lieu tracing, a question arises as to
whether the marital estate that supplied the consideration should be reimbursed for that contribution
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and fleeting dictum in the 1908 California Supreme Court decision Nilson v.
Sarment.15 6 The issue was whether a house and lot bought by the husband
with community funds had become the wife's separate property when the
vendor deeded it to the wife alone.'57 The party claiming the house was
separate property argued that the husband was making a gift of the land to
his wife as evidenced by terms of the fire insurance coverage-coverage he
had also bought with community funds-directing any policy proceeds to be
paid to the wife.'18  The court said in response: "If the house and lot,
although standing in her name, were not her separate property, the
circumstance that insurance money would have been payable to her in the
event of loss by fire would not make that money her separate property any
more than the burnt house was."l59 The suggestion seems to be that the
insurance proceeds would take on the same classification-community or
separate-as the insured property that burned down, even though some
aspects of the policy would lead to a different result.
B. In-Lieu Tracing in Cases Involving Casualty Insurance
Nilson was cited as an in-lieu tracing authority in Belmont v. Belmont'60
which appears to be the first case to base a holding on that theory. A divorce
court had classified a $85,000 promissory note payable to the husband as
community property.' 6 ' The husband owned a packing house as his separate
property when he married his wife.162 It burned down, and the intermediate
appellate court inferred the husband used fire insurance proceeds to re-
establish his packing house business elsewhere.163 The court declared: "The
proceeds of property insurance take the character of the insured property.
(either with or without interest). For example, in Thigpen v. Thigpen, 91 So. 2d 12 (La. 1956), the
husband owned a fractional share of a building as his separate property and used community funds to
insure the building against fire. Id at 22. It burned down, and in-lieu tracing was used to classify
the insurance proceeds paid out as the husband's separate property. "It may be," said the court, "that
the owners of [the building] are indebted to the community for the amount of these premiums[,] but
no claim is made herein for any such reimbursement." Id. Grace G. Blumberg, Marital Property
Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, Workers' Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutes: An
Insurance, or Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1250, 1281, 1289-90 (1986) (a generally
useful article on the topic of in-lieu tracing), agrees that reimbursement is appropriate in a case like
Thigpen but would deny it in other situations where the estate paying the consideration for, but
getting no ownership interest in, an asset directly traceable to the payment due to a court's use of in-
lieu tracing could have benefitted from its outlay under a different fact scenario.
156. 96 P. 315 (Cal. 1908).
157. Id at 315.
158. Id
159. Id at 317.
160. 10 Cal. Rptr. 227 (Ct. App. 1961).
161. Id. at 229.
162. Id. at 232.
163. Id.
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Nilson v. Sarment, 153 Cal. 524, 529, 96 P. 315. . . ."'" The husband took
the $85,000 note upon sale of the re-established business. 65  The court of
appeal held that by tracing back-through the insurance payment-to his
pre-marriage separate property the husband had overcome the presumption
that the note acquired during marriage was community property, and the
judgment had to be reversed.'66
It is apparent that Belmont's tracing of the insurance proceeds to the
property damaged rather than to the premiums paid is logical, particularly
when one considers that there is little, if any, relationship between the
proceeds paid and the premiums paid, but there is a direct relationship
between the proceeds paid and the value of the insured item. 161 On the other
164. Id. The court did not mention the likelihood that the husband had used community funds to
acquire the fire insurance coverage.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 233. Just one year later, in Russell v. Williams, 374 P.2d 827 (Cal. 1962), the
California Supreme Court may have implicitly disapproved of the 1961 Belmont decision. In
Russell, spouses Dorothy and John owned a building in joint tenancy. Id. at 828. Dorothy obtained
a Nevada divorce, and the court made no order dealing with property issues. John insured the
structure against loss by fire, using his separate funds. Id. at 829. The structure burned down, and
the insurer paid insurance proceeds to John. Dorothy contended that "the moneys paid by the
insurance company under the subject policy constituted proceeds of the property that was destroyed
and retain the character of that property." Not so, held the court. The insurance contract was
personal to John: "[T]he proceeds of a fire insurance policy are not a substitute for the property" lost.
Id. Belmont was not referred to. Blumberg, supra note 155, at 1281 n.158, says Russell is
distinguishable from Belmont because decisions like Russell "do not present any marital property
issues." But, since the Nevada divorce court in Russell, 374 P.2d at 828-29, "made no provision
respecting any property rights of the parties"-one suspects this was an ex parte divorce, the court
lacking jurisdictional power to affect property rights-how could the divorce eliminate Belmont's
having accorded Dorothy the right to trace the insurance proceeds from a policy bought during
marriage to the structure burned down, rather than to the consideration paid for the policy, if she had
a right arising out of the marriage to invoke in-lieu tracing? That Russell apparently establishes that
in-lieu tracing does not apply in the context of casualty insurance policy proceeds claimed by
spouses has little if any bearing on the applicability of the in-lieu tracing principle to the
classification of wrongful death damages received by a married person, given the California
Supreme Court's adoption of in-lieu tracing post-Russell in classification contexts more closely
relates to the wrongful death damages classification dispute than the classification proceeds of a
casualty insurance contract. See infra text accompanying notes 176-212.
167. For example, a $50,000 automobile bought with a husband's separate property cash could be
totally destroyed in a wreck occurring shortly after he paid $250 for an initial collision insurance
premium with community funds, resulting in a payment from the insurer 200 times more than the
sum paid with community funds. In Jackson v. Jackson (In re Marriage of Jackson), 260 Cal. Rptr.
508 (Ct. App. 1989), the spouses used community funds to buy automobile insurance with $300,000
in uninsured motorist coverage. Id. at 509. The wife was then injured in an accident tortiously
caused by an uninsured driver, and the insurer paid $85,000 to the wife's medical providers and
$225,000 to the wife and her attorney. Id. At divorce the issue was whether assets bought with the
funds paid to the wife by the insurer were ordinary community property subject to 50-50 division,
which they would be under direct tracing to the community funds used to pay premiums or were
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hand, if the insurance policy is taken out as a form of investment, tracing to
the premium[s] paid is appropriate. This Article concludes that at least some
components of an award of damages paid by a tortfeasor to a spouse for the
wrongful death of a relative, such as his or her child, should be classified as
the parent-spouse's separate property. 68 But if that spouse used community
funds to make the most recent premium payment 69 on, for example, a
$500,000 term life insurance policy on the same child, proceeds paid upon
the death of the child should be traced to the community payment, as that
sum is governed by the terms of the investment, and that sum is not related
to the actual pecuniary loss suffered by the parent upon his or her child's
death.1o
C. In-Lieu Tracing Is Applied in Employee-Benefit Cases
Certain contracts that provide for employee severance benefits
constitute another area where California courts use in-lieu tracing, although
direct tracing could be used to classify payments made under the contract to
a married person as community or separate property (or a bit of both)."' For
example, if severance benefits are provided for in an employment contract
made before actual termination of the spouse-employee's job was a
consideration, direct tracing is applied, and the court would look to the
amount of community and separate labor under the employment contract
received by the wife in lieu of a tort case settlement that the tortfeasor or his insurer might have
made in favor of the wife, since such settlement payments would have been awardable entirely to her
at divorce under former section 4800(b)(4) of the California Civil Code (current version at CAL.
FAM. CODE § 2603(b) (West 2004)). Id. at 511. The court held for the wife under the in-lieu tracing
theory, stating: "The fact community funds were used to pay the premiums on the Fireman's policy
does not compel a contrary result. . . . [U]ninsured motorist coverage is not an item of protection in
most instances which a member of the consuming public consciously seeks out and buys." Id. at 512
(internal quotations omitted). In other words, the spouses did not view the premiums as making an
investment in uninsured motorist coverage.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 250-85.
169. In California, with term insurance each premium paid is viewed as buying a distinct
contract, unless the insured has become medically uninsurable-not the case in the hypothetical in
the text-so that the separate or community character of previous premium payments is disregarded
in classifying the proceeds. See Elfmont v. Elfmont (In re Marriage of Elfmont), 891 P.2d 136, 142
(Cal. 1995); see also Pritchard v. Logan (In re Estate of Logan), 236 Cal. Rptr. 368, 372, 372 n.8
(Ct. App. 1987).
170. The $500,000 proceeds from the term life insurance policy should be community even if,
perchance, the parent-spouse also obtained a $500,000 wrongful death judgment against the
tortfeasor responsible for the death of the child, on which the plaintiff was unable to recover from
the judgment-proof and uninsured defendant. In selecting a $500,000 policy paid for with
community funds, the parent-spouse could not have foreseen that such would be the amount of loss
resulting from the death of the child, as the timing of that death was completely uncertain. The
purpose of buying the policy was primarily investment.
171. See generally Lehman v. Lehman (In re Marriage of Lehman), 955 P.2d 451, 456-59 (Cal.
1998).
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that earned the benefit.172 On the other hand, if the right to severance benefit
is created in a contract negotiated when the employer was instituting a
separation plan and encouraging certain employees to take early retirement,
in-lieu tracing is employed to make the classification of benefits, even
though prior service (i.e., labor by the employee spouse) is a condition of
eligibility to receive the benefit.173  The payments to the employee are
viewed as in lieu of lost earnings he or she incurs while seeking new
employment.174  If the employee taking early retirement is permanently
separated from his or her spouse when the benefits are paid so that the
living-apart statute applies, the benefits are classified as separate property,
although they would not have been paid but for substantial community labor
by the employee spouse.'
D. In-Lieu Tracing Appears in Cases Involving Personal Injuries Suffered
by Married Persons
1. Marriage of Jones
For purposes of this Article's conclusion concerning classification of
wrongful death damages received by a married person, the most significant
expansion of the use of in-lieu tracing is into classifying statutory or
contractually-promised compensation payments arising out of a married
person's suffering personal injuries or otherwise becoming disabled. The
first decision to employ in-lieu tracing in this context was In re Marriage of
Jones,76 decided by the California Supreme Court in 1975. There the
husband entered U.S. military service in 1957, married his wife in 1964, and
lost a leg in active duty in Vietnam in 1969.1n Under a statutory scheme
providing for disability pay, the husband's community labor in combat
172. See, e.g., Horn v. Horn (In re Marriage of Horn), 226 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App. 1986)
(discussing how a severance benefits provision included in union-negotiated employment contract
made two years before termination of employee became an issue).
173. See, e.g., Frahm v. Frahm (In re Marriage of Frahm), 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31, 35 (Ct. App. 1996)
(only employees with one year of service to the employer eligible under the early retirement contract
plan); Lawson v. Lawson (In re Marriage of Lawson), 256 Cal. Rptr. 283, 285 (Ct. App. 1989)
(amount of severance benefit tied to total period of employment, including time while married);
DeShurley v. DeShurley (In re Marriage of DeShurley), 255 Cal. Rptr. 150, 150 (Ct. App. 1989)
(same).
174. See Lawson, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
175. See id.
176. 531 P.2d 420 (Cal. 1975).
177. Id at 421.
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helped him qualify for a disability award'18 tied to his years of service. *
The California Supreme Court rejected the wife's direct-tracing contention
that the award was 5/12 community because it was earned in part by
community labor.180  Rather, employing in-lieu tracing, the court held that
the divorcing husband's disability benefits arose from "the personal anguish
caused by the permanent disability as well as . . . from his compelled
premature military retirement and from diminished ability to compete in the
civilian job market."' 8 1
2. Marriage of Saslow
In re Marriage of Saslow,182 decided by the California Supreme Court in
1985, differed from Jones in that in Saslow the husband's right to receive
disability payments was not a benefit automatically attached to his
employment status but instead arose out of a private contract he had
voluntarily entered into. 83 The husband had used only community funds to
obtain the contractual coverage, but that played no controlling role in the
court's classification of benefits.184  The court held that a determination
should be made as to whether the husband's intention in entering into the
contract was (1) to obtain a replacement for future lost earnings during a
period where he would have been working if not disabled or, (2) to obtain a
178. Id. at 422.
179. Id. at 423.
180. Id.
181. Id at 421. The Jones court also declared: "Pain, suffering, disfigurement or the loss of a
limb, as here, is the peculiar anguish of the person who suffers it; it can never be wholly shared even
by a loving spouse and surely not after the dissolution of a marriage by a departed one." Id at 424.
Jones also found support for its holding in the statute then in effect in California concerning the
classification of personal injuries; the statute looked to marital status at the time of the receipt of
monetary damages rather than the time of injury to classify them as community or separate property,
with the issue in Jones being whether the wife had any interest in disability benefits to be paid post-
divorce when the community had ceased to exist. Id. The time-of-receipt statute was enacted in
1968 as former section 169.3 of the California Civil Code, 1968 Cal. Stat. 1079, which had been
renumbered by 1975, when Jones was decided, as Civil Code section 5126, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3342.
Effective 1980, the legislature removed the time-of-receipt test from former section 1526 in favor of
a time-of-injury analysis. 1979 Cal. Stat. 1971. Although the California Supreme Court has
departed from some aspects of Jones, as in Saslow v. Saslow (In re Marriage ofSaslow), 710 P.2d
346, 346-49 (Cal. 1985) (noting at page 349, the 1979 revision of former section 5126 of the
California Civil Code), Jones has been favorably cited post-I 980 by both the state supreme court and
courts of appeal for its holding that disability benefits are to be classified using the in-lieu tracing
approach rather than direct tracing. See, e.g., Elfmont v. Elfmont (In re Marriage of Elfmont), 891
P.2d 136, 142 (Cal. 1995); Raphael v. Bloomfield, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 583, 586-87 (Ct. App. 2003).
These citations of Jones indicate that the judge-made in-lieu tracing approach, and not former
section 1526, is now considered to be the basis for the separate property classification in Jones.
182. Saslow, 710 P.2d 346.
183. Id at 348.
184. Id at 350-52.
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pension supplement for a period of time after he would have retired.' If his
intent was the latter, the court would employ direct tracing to premiums
paid; if the former, under in-lieu tracing, insurance payments received prior
to the contemplated age of retirement, when the husband was living separate
and apart from his wife and after the divorce, would be his separate property,
even though the coverage was purchased with community funds.18 6
3. Marriage of McDonald
A few months after Jones, the 1975 court of appeal decision, In re
Marriage of McDonald,'17 relied on Jones-also a 1975 decision-in
applying the in-lieu tracing theory to classify a husband's workers'
compensation award as his separate property.188  The court found that the
money paid to the injured worker would replace his lost earnings after
separation from his wife and after divorce and therefore should be classified
as his separate property.'" The McDonald court disregarded the likelihood
that the injured spouse qualified for an award under the state's statutory no-
fault scheme of workers' compensation based on community labor (i.e.,
direct tracing was eschewed). 190
4. Marriage of Fisk
At the time of the McDonald and Jones decisions, the California statute
dealing with classification of personal injury damages provided that such
damages would be the victim-spouse's separate property if received after the
payee began living separate and apart from his spouse, which was the fact
pattern in McDonald and Jones.191 Accordingly, the court in McDonald did
not have to decide whether the workers' compensation award constituted
185. Id. at 351-52. But see Rossin v. Rossin (In re Marriage of Rossin), 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427 (Ct.
App. 2009) (holding that the wife's intent in buying a private policy of disability insurance was not
to be considered and instead direct tracing to separate funds used to pay premiums controlled
classification of benefits where the policy was fully paid for and the wife had begun to receive
benefits before marrying the husband).
186. Saslow, 710 P.2d at 352.
187. 125 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Ct. App. 1975).
188. Id. at 162.
189. Id. The court observed that a workers' compensation award "does not ... include pain and
suffering as personal injury damages do," as did the statutory disability pay award in Jones, but this
difference did not serve as a basis for distinguishing Jones and its use of in-lieu tracing. Id.
190. Id. at 161-62.
191. Id. at 160; see Jones v. Jones (In re Marriage of Jones), 531 P.2d 420 (Cal. 1975); 1979 Cal.
Stat. 1971.
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personal injury damages under the statute, because holding that the statute
did apply would not have changed the result: both the statute and the judge-
made in-lieu tracing theory would classify the award as the husband's
separate property.192  However, between McDonald and the date of the
husband's injury in the 1992 court of appeal decision In re Marriage of
Fisk,'93 former Civil Code section 4800(b)(4), the classification statute, was
rewritten to provide that a married person's personal injury damages would
be community property "if the cause of action for the damages arose during
the marriage" and before separation; this abrogated the prior rule that receipt
of the damages after separation would require classifying personal injury
damages as the separate property of the victim-spouse.194
In Fisk, the husband suffered an on-the-job injury two years before
separation, although the workers' compensation award was paid to him after
he began living separate and apart from his wife.' The wife argued that the
husband's workers' compensation award was, in the language of section
4800(b)(4), "'money or other property received .. . by a person in
satisfaction of a judgment for damages for his or her personal
injuries... " " Fisk held that a "workers' compensation permanent
disability award is not a satisfaction of judgment for damages in an action at
law . . ."'9' Because it did not include a pain-and-suffering component, the
workers' compensation award differed from a tort judgment based on a
plaintiffs suffering personal injuries. ' In addition it was "significant" that
192. See McDonald, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
193. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 95 (Ct. App. 1992).
194. This provision was first enacted in 1979 as part of subdivision (c) of section 4800. 1979
Cal. Stat. 1971; see also Fisk, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100 n.4.
195. Fisk, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97.
196. Id. at 100 n.4 (quoting 1979 Cal. Stat. 1971). The wife also argued in Fisk that if the
workers' compensation award was to be classified as the husband's separate property, the
community (and the wife as to half) was entitled to reimbursement for community funds spent on
care of the injured husband during the seven months he was unable to work (prior to the receipt of
the award), under former California Civil Code section 5126(b). Id. This reimbursement claim was
legally valid if, in the language of former section 5126(a), the husband's workers' compensation
award was "money or other property received ... in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for
personal injuries," the identical language of former section 4800(b)(4) of the California Civil Code.
Id. The Fisk court's analysis applied to the phrase as used in both sections 4800(b)(4) and 5126(a).
Id.
197. Id
198. Id at 100. "Moreover," added the court, "workers' compensation is awarded without regard
to fault." Id. However, that seems not to be a basis for distinguishing such awards from tort
judgments based on similar personal injuries. For example, if stored dynamite exploded at a place of
business injuring a spouse who was on the job as an employee there as well as a non-employee
visitor, both victims could recover for lost wages resulting from their injuries on a no-fault basis-
the visitor in a strict liability tort suit in a court of law and the employee under the workers'
compensation statutes via an administrative tribunal. See Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162,
1165 (Cal. 1978) (strict liability in tort originated as a limited concept imposed, "for example, upon
keepers of wild animals, or those who handled explosives or other dangerous substances, or who
engaged in ultrahazardous activities").
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the statute applied "only to judgments."l 99 That is, the legislature's choice
of the word "judgment" to the exclusion of "award" was deliberate.200 Since
no statute addressed the issue in Fisk of classifying workers' compensation
awards, the court held that the judge-made rule of in-lieu tracing was
applicable, and the payments were the husband's separate property.201
5. Raphael v. Bloomfield
Raphael v. Bloomfield202 expanded on the in-lieu tracing of Fisk by
apportioning a workers' compensation award into community and separate
property components.203 In Raphael, the wife was permanently disabled by
a job-related injury and received a lump sum workers' compensation award
of $311,859.04 six months before she began living separate and apart from
her husband.204 At divorce, the trial court classified all of the award as
community property because the wife received it before separation, and the
court did not employ in-lieu tracing. 205 The court of appeal reversed,
holding that precedents such as Jones, McDonald, and Fisk required it to
"examine[] the purpose of the disability payments." 206  After such an
inquiry, the court in Raphael stated that "a lump sum permanent disability
award received prior to separation is the injured spouse's separate property
to the extent it is meant to compensate for the injured spouse's diminished
earning capacity (and/or medical expenses) after separation." 207 The court
concluded:
To the extent a portion of the lump sum award represented benefits
that, in the absence of wife's settlement, would have been paid prior
to the parties' separation (i.e., the weekly disability payments she
199. Fisk, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 100-01.
202. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 583 (Ct. App. 2003).
203. Id. at 590.
204. Id. at 584.
205. Id. at 585.
206. Id. at 586.
207. Id at 587; accord Hatcher v. Hatcher, 933 P.2d 1222, 1226 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (portion of
lump sum workers' compensation award based on permanent disability received by spouse during
marriage viewed as a replacement for post-divorce earnings became separate property at divorce);
Cupp v. Cupp (In re Marriage of Cupp), 730 P.2d 870, 872 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (same).
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would have received from the time of the settlement until
separation), those payments would be community property ... .208
Raphael can be explained only if the community got a present,
defeasible estate and the wife a future interest (an executory interest). The
community or separate "character of property is determined by its status at
the time of its acquisition." 209 In Raphael the lump sum award-viewed as a
present interest in property acquired during marriage and before
separation-had to be 100% community property because it was then
unknown whether the spouses would separate or divorce or their marriage
would terminate by death before all the funds were expended.210 In essence,
Raphael holds that, at the time of acquisition, while the community received
a present interest, the wife's separate estate received a future interest-a
springing executory interest that would become a present possessory
interest,21 and divest the community estate (which held a fee simple subject
208. Raphael, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590. According to Ruiz v. Ruiz (In re Marriage of Ruiz), 122
Cal. Rptr. 3d 914, 916-17 (Ct. App. 2011), Raphael places the burden on the injured spouse of
proving how much of a lump sum workers' compensation award she received is not community
property but rather is separate property received in lieu of wages that would have been paid or
medical bills that would have been incurred after the spouses permanently separated.
209. In re Miller, 187 P.2d 722, 726 (Cal. 1947); see also Buol v. Buol (In re Marriage of Buol),
705 P.2d 354, 357 (Cal. 1985) ("The status of property as community or separate is normally
determined at the time of its acquisition." (quoting Bouquet v. Bouquet (In re Marriage of Bouquet),
546 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Cal. 1976))). Miller goes on to say after the quotation in text: "Subsequent
changes in the form of the property do not alter its nature as separate or community." 187 P.2d at
726.
210. See Raphael, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590.
211. Such a theory is also necessary to explain Saslow v. Saslow (In re Marriage of Saslow), 710
P.2d 346 (Cal. 1985). See supra text accompanying notes 182-86. Any present interest in the
contract rights against the insurance company issuing the disability policy to the husband there could
only be community property at the time the disability insurance contracts were entered into, as no
permanent separation of the spouses or termination of their marriage could be predicted at that time.
See Saslow, 710 P.2d at 357. Under one of the disability insurance contracts acquired by the
husband, payments would commence being made to him upon his becoming disabled, would be
reduced when he attained age seventy-five, and would continue to be made at the reduced rate until
his death. Id. at 347-48. On remand from the supreme court, the trial court was to determine at
what age the spouses envisioned the husband ceasing work and retiring. Id at 352-53. If that were
found to be age sixty-five, the classification of community and separate interests at the time of
acquisition of this policy would be as follows: The community received a present interest, which,
under the estate system for classifying interests in property, would be a fee simple subject to an
executory interest. Id. As community property, this present interest would be subject to equal
management by the husband and wife, CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(a) (West 2004), unless the wife
agreed contractually to sole management by the husband. The husband's separate estate received
when the disability insurance contract was purchased a future interest in the form of an executory
interest that might or might not become possessory. Permanent separation of the spouses after the
husband became disabled before age sixty-five--or a divorce or the wife's death after such disability
occurred and before husband was sixty-five-would result, due to application of in-lieu tracing, in
the community's present interest being divested and the husband's separately-owned executory
interest becoming possessory. But when the contract was made, the community estate also received
not just a present interest but its own future interest, an executory interest that could divest in whole
or in part the separate estate of the husband that became possessory when his executory interest was
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to an executory interest), should the wife and husband begin to live separate
and apart.212
E. In-Lieu Tracing Should Be Employed in All Tort Recovery Cases Where
a Statute Does Not Dictate the Classification Approach
1. Two Statutes Bar Use of In-Lieu Tracing
The foregoing consideration of the history of classifying personal injury
funds received by a married person as separate or community property and
of the development of in-lieu tracing in the classification of such funds
establishes the following: (1) The California Supreme Court realizes that
classifying 100% of a married person's personal injury recovery as
community property is quite illogical, as some of the funds compensate for
harm that is personal in nature, such as pain and suffering.2 13 But, (2) two
statutes, Family Code section 2603, applicable at divorce, and section 780,
applicable during marriage, apparently 214 will be viewed as legislative
barriers to correcting the illogical classification with respect to "personal
injury damages." Notably, however, (3) that statutory term is narrowly
converted into a present interest. Because the spouses agreed to buy a flow of funds to be paid after
the husband became sixty-five-the date on which the spouses thought he would retire-the law
would treat the spouses as acquiring a supplemental pension to be paid to him beginning on his
sixty-fifth birthday. See Saslow, 710 P.2d at 357. These benefits would be classified by direct
tracing, not in-lieu tracing. If only community funds had been paid to the insurance company, the
flow of money paid after the husband became sixty-five would be community property, even though
the spouses were permanently separated, due to direct tracing. If the husband turned sixty-five after
a divorce, the flow of money thereafter would be former community property owned by the ex-
spouses in tenancy in common unless the divorce court had specifically dealt with this potential flow
of money in which the community had an interest under direct tracing. The ex-wife's tenancy in
common interest would be subject to her sole management (unless, again, she had waived
management powers by joining in the disability insurance contract as a party to waive management
power). If the ex-husband became sixty-five after his marriage ended by his wife's death, he might
own the flow of money as tenant in common with the wife's legatee under her will.
212. Under in-lieu tracing theory, if at the time of such a final separation some medical bills
arising out of the wife's injury remained unpaid, the community ought not to be divested of
sufficient funds to pay such bills.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 124-29, 132-35.
214. Recall that courts in Louisiana and Texas, dealing with statutes that on their face seemed to
require classification of all or some components of a spouse's recovery of personal injury damages
as the victim's separate property, concluded that the statutes did not bar them from classifying
certain components as community property by use of the judge-made in-lieu tracing theory. See
supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. I think it unlikely that a California court would undercut
a clear legislative directive as has happened in Louisiana and Texas.
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interpreted.215 (4) In-lieu tracing will be applied if a married person has
received funds to compensate for personal injuries and neither of these two
statutes applies where the funds are traceable either to a disability insurance
policy or to an award by a workers' compensation tribunal. Then, (5) the
lump sum will be broken down into component parts (6) with some
classified as community property and some as the victim-spouse's separate
property, as was done in Raphael, the 2003 workers' compensation case.216
Workers' compensation awards are based on strict liability theory.217 A
wrongful death cause of action is statutory and usually sounds in
negligence 2 18 although recovery has been granted on a strict liability
theory.219 But when the issue is whether in-lieu tracing is appropriate, the
fact that most wrongful death cases involve negligence seems to provide no
sound basis for distinguishing Raphael's use of in-lieu tracing220 to classify
personal injury damages arising out of a statutorily based claim (workers'
compensation) based on no-fault principles. Note, too, the similarity that in
both wrongful death and workers' compensation claims, damages do not
include a pain and suffering component.221
2. Keena Can Be Overturned by the Court of Appeal
It follows, then, that Keena is truly ripe for judicial abrogation, insofar
as it bars tracing a wrongful death cause of action to the type of loss the
damages are intended to compensate.222 The California Supreme Court
should disapprove the entire line of Keena-based precedents. Moreover,
because "there is no horizontal stare decisis in the California Court of
215. See supra text accompanying notes 146-50; see also supra text accompanying notes 196-
200. On the other hand, Klug v. Klug (In re Marriage ofKlug), 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 332 (Ct. App.
2005), construed the term damages for "personal injuries" as used in section 781 of the California
Family Code (companion statute to section 780, which Klug necessarily would have construed
similarly) and section 2603 very broadly. Damages for "personal injuries" as used in these statutes
was held to embrace a wife's recovery of money damages based on a legal malpractice claim against
her attorney, who had assisted her husband in secretly hiding $2 million worth of community
property assets in offshore accounts! Id. at 337. Surely such an interpretation of "personal injuries"
is untenable.
216. Raphael v. Bloomfield, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 583 (Ct. App. 2003), discussed supra in text
accompanying notes 202-12.
217. See, e.g., Bell v. Indus. Vangas, Inc., 637 P.2d 266, 272 (Cal. 1981).
218. See, e.g., Helling v. Lew, 104 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Ct. App. 1972).
219. The term "wrongful act" in what is now section 377.60 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure (West 2004 & Supp. 2011), which defines the California wrongful death action, is
construed to mean any tortious act, so that the wrongful death plaintiff can base his or her claim on a
theory of strict liability in tort, thereby not having to prove fault by the defendant. See, e.g., Barrett
v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307 (Ct. App. 1990) (strict liability for death caused by
defective product, a piece of earth-moving equipment).
220. Raphael, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590.
221. See supra note 198; see also infra note 249 and accompanying text.
222. For a discussion of Keena, see supra Part III.A.
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Appeal,"223 it appears that each court of appeal in the state is authorized to
jettison these precedents without waiting for the California Supreme Court
to do so. 224 Although the California Supreme Court did indicate approval of
Keena's result by appending an "Opinion of the Supreme Court Denying
Hearing" to the court of appeal opinion,225 because it did not grant a hearing,
the opinion is not supreme court precedent.226 Moreover, the opinion was
not published in the California Reports, which collect precedents of the
California Supreme Court, but in the California Appellate Reports, where
decisions of the courts of appeal appear.
Additionally, the California Supreme Court's statement in Flores v.
Brown that a spouse's recovery for wrongful death is community property2 27
is clearly dictum and not binding on the courts of appeal, as the Flores
holding was that after a marriage is dissolved by death, the cause of action in
the surviving parent is separate property;22 the court had no need to
comment on the pre-dissolution status of the cause of action. The California
Supreme Court's similar statement in Fuentes v. Tucker229 about a wrongful
death recovery being community property was apparently also dictum.230
The court stated that because the husband was the sole manager of the
community, it was error to have permitted the wife/mother of the decedent to
be a party to the suit; however, the court actually held that the defendant
223. Sarti v. Salt Creek Ltd., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 510 (Ct. App. 2008); accord Jessen v. Mentor
Corp., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714, 721 (Ct. App. 2008) (court not bound by contrary decision of different
division within the Second District); McCallum v. McCallum, 235 Cal. Rptr. 396, 400 n.4 (Ct. App.
1987) (court of appeal not bound to follow decision out of a different district); 9 WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 498, at 558-60 (5th ed. 2008).
224. The technical terminology of the process is this: The California Supreme Court would
"disapprove" these cases. If Division One of the First Appellate District, which decided Keena,
were to clean up the law in this area, it would "overrule" Keena and "decline to follow," due to
erroneous reasoning, decisions of other courts of appeal. See, e.g., supra note 65 (cases holding in
accordance with Keena that 100% of a wrongful death recovery received by a spouse had to be
community property because tracing beyond the accrual of the cause of action was not allowed).
225. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
226. See Thompson v. Dep't of Corr., 18 P.3d 1198, 1202 (Cal. 2001) (dealing with an order to
stay execution of a death sentence made without granting a hearing, where the court declared:
"[U]nlike our decisions rendered after granting review, hearing oral argument, and preparing a
written opinion, our minute orders are not binding precedent."); see also Leonard Donald Dungan,
Comment, Courts: Significance of the Practice of the California Supreme Court of Commenting on
the Opinion of the District Court of Appeal When Denying a Hearing After Judgment, 28 CALIF. L.
REv. 81, 87 (1939) ("The statements of the court [in denying a hearing] that it approves . . . of part
of the opinion below seem to be no more than dicta .....
227. See supra text accompanying note 70.
228. Flores v. Brown, 248 P.2d 922, 925, 927 (Cal. 1952).
229. 187 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1947).
230. See supra text accompanying note 66.
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suffered no prejudice,23 1 which meant that the court did not have to decide if
the cause of action was community property.
VII.APPLYING IN-LIEU TRACING TO THE SEVERAL COMPONENTS THAT
CAN MAKE UP A WRONGFUL DEATH MONEY JUDGMENT
A. The Texas Precedents
Texas courts first employed in-lieu tracing to classify wrongful death
damages received by a married person in 1900 in Bohan v. Bohan.23 2 The
court there explained why its decision earlier that year, Brush Electric Light
& Power Co. v. Lefevre,233 had not abolished the rule that in personal injury
cases the contributory negligence of one spouse would be imputed to the
other spouse to bar recovery of damages, if the recovery would have been
community property co-owned by the negligent spouse.234 In Lefevre, the
mother's wrongful death recovery was her separate property:
When it is remembered that young Lefevre was over 21 years of age
at the time of his death, and whatever he might have contributed
towards the support of his mother, had he lived, would have been a
gift to her, and clearly her separate property, it seems equally clear
that the amount awarded the mother by the jury in lieu of, or as
compensation for, the loss of such probable contributions by the
son, would also be her separate property.235
In the more recent wrongful death case where in-lieu tracing was
employed, Johnson v. Holly Farms of Texas, Inc.,236 decided in 1987, the
jury in the wife's suit for wrongful death of her minor daughter was
instructed that it could award damages consisting of three components: "(1)
pecuniary loss; (2) loss of companionship; and (3) mental pain and
anguish."237 Because the husband's contributory negligence was an issue,
231. Fuentes, 187 P.2d at 758.
232. 56 S.W. 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1900) (no writ).
233. Brush Electric Light & Power Co. v. Lefevre, 55 S.W. 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1900), revd on another ground, 57 S.W. 640 (Tex. 1900).
234. Bohan, 56 S.W. at 960.
235. Id Texas courts in wrongful death cases do not face the possibility that gifts the deceased
child was precluded from making due to being tortiously killed might have generated community
property. See Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472, 477-78 (1883). Unlike the law in California (see supra
note 105), in Texas if a donor makes a gift jointly to a husband and wife, they do not hold the
property in community, but each spouse takes an undivided half interest as separate property (i.e.,
tenancy in common property is created).
236. Johnson v. Holly Farms of Tex., Inc., 731 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987) (no
writ).
237. Id at 646.
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the mother/wife would obtain a full recovery only if each damage
component was correctly classified by the trial court as her separate
property. The intermediate appellate court so held. Pecuniary loss
consisted of
the care, maintenance, support, services, advice, counsel and
contributions of pecuniary value that the child would have given the
parent. Each of those items is in the nature of a gift from the
child. . . [and we] classify that kind of pecuniary loss as the
separate property of the spouse suffering the loss.239
Holly Farms classified the loss of companionship damages awarded to the
wife as her separate property by following Texas Court of Appeals
precedent2 40 that based its classification on a Texas Supreme Court decision,
Whittlesey v. Miller.2 4 1 Whittlesey had held that damages recovered by a
wife's asserting a loss of her husband's consortium claim due to his
tortiously-inflicted physical injuries were her separate property because they
were a "personal injury recovery" under a Texas classification statute (now
section 3.001(3) of the Texas Family Code).242
Finally, Holly Farms classified the damages recovered for mental pain
and anguish based on a Texas Supreme Court decision, Graham v.
Franco,24 which declared that even without the statute calling for a separate
property classification of personal injury damages, principles of in-lieu
tracing would require Texas courts to reach the same result as to recovery
for pain and suffering through judge-made law.24
238. Id. at 646-47.
239. Id.
240. Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 678 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984), affd, 699
S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1985). The Texas court of appeals said: "We see no practical distinction between
the loss of spousal consortium and the loss of companionship of children; both constitute damage to
emotional interests." Id at 210.
241. 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978).
242. Id. at 669; TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001(3) (West 2006).
243. 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972); see Holly Farms, 731 S.W.2d at 646 (citing Graham).
244. Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 394. The issue of what the classification rule would be without the
statute arose in Graham because article 16, section 15, of the Texas constitution is construed as
barring the Texas legislature from enacting statutes that depart from the basic Spanish-Mexican law
of 1840 with respect to what constituted separate and community property. See Arnold v. Leonard,
273 S.W. 799 (Tex. 1925). The Texas Supreme Court had previously in Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex.
331 (1883), used McFadden-type "logic" (focusing on the marital status of the tort victim-spouse
when she or he suffered personal injuries) to classify all personal injury damages received by a
spouse after a tort during marriage as community property. If Ezell was consistent with civil law,
then the statute seeking to reverse its holding violated article 16, section 15. Graham quoted the
community property treatises by McKay and De Funiak, see supra notes 42, 54, 121, to conclude
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In sum, in Holly Farms, all of the components of damages recovered by
a married person based on the wrongful death of a family member were
classified as separate property of the payee. This was based on: (1) the
court's own in-lieu tracing analysis for loss of financial contributions from
the decedent, and (2) precedents that classified certain elements of personal
injury damages recovered by the victim-spouse as separate property when
the tort involved the spouse herself and not a tortiously killed family
member. 24 5  Each such precedent employed in-lieu tracing based on the
Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of what is now Texas Family Code
section 3.001(3)246 or on the Texas Supreme Court's statement as to what the
judge-made law would be in the absence of that statute.
B. Applying In-Lieu Tracing to Classify the Components of a California
Wrongful Death Recovery
According to the recent California Supreme Court decision in Corder v.
Corder,24 ' damages recoverable in a wrongful death suit fall into two broad
categories: (1) direct "financial benefits" to the plaintiff from the decedent
"'reasonably to be expected in the future, and (2) the monetary equivalent of
loss of comfort, society and protection' arising out of the death.248 The first
category is comprised of several distinct types of financial benefits. Unlike
Texas, which recognizes a third broad category of wrongful death damages,
the California Supreme Court does not recognize Texas's third category and
instead bars California courts from granting recovery "for the grief or sorrow
attendant upon the death of a loved one."249
"that injuries to the wife were her separate right under the Spanish and Mexican law upon which our
system of community property law was based." Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 394. Graham also quoted
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 260, 264 (1869), which traced the cause
of action for personal injuries to the body of the spouse that she brought to the marriage: "'Who is
the natural owner of the right? Not the husband, because the injury did not accrue to him; it was
wholly personal to the wife. It was her body that was bruised; it was she who suffered the agonizing
mental and physical pain."' Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 393-94.
245. Holly Farms, 731 S.W.2d at 646-47.
246. See supra text accompanying note 52 describing the Texas Supreme Court's engrafting onto
this statute a rule that the portion of the recovery for the victim-spouse's medical bills that would
reimburse the community for having paid such expenses or relieve the community of its obligation
to pay such expenses in the future should be classified as community property.
247. Corder v. Corder, 161 P.3d 172 (Cal. 2007).
248. Id. at 183 (quoting Benwell v. Dean, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 398 (Ct. App. 1967)).
249. Id. Accord Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1028 (Cal. 1977) (no compensation for
"sorrow and distress . . . . 'Nothing can be recovered as a solatium for wounded feelings."' (quoting
Ure v. Maggio Bros. Co., 75 P.2d 534, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938))).
910
HeinOnline  -- 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 910 2011-2012
[Vol. 39: 865, 2012] California Wrongful Death Damages
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
1. Loss of Direct Financial Benefits
a. Lost Bequests, Devises and Inheritances by Intestate Succession
"[T]here might be a reasonable expectation that if the life of a deceased
had continued he might have accumulated a greater estate, and that the
increased estate would have been inherited by the statutory beneficiaries as
his heirs."250 Wrongful death damages recovered by a married person based
on the theory that, but for the death, the married person would have acquired
the property by intestate succession at the decedent's death at a normal age
should be classified under the in-lieu tracing approach as the lost inheritance
would have been classified. Usually it would be separate property of the
heir/spouse.251
Suppose, however, the decedent were the child or grandchild of the
husband and wife suing for wrongful death, the decedent's sole heirs, who
would take an inheritance "equally" under section 6402(b) of the California
Probate Code.252 The statute does not say how the husband and wife take
equally, but equality could exist in these three ways: (1) if each took a
distinct portion of the estate as his or her separate property, (2) if they took
the inheritance as community property,253 or (3) if they took the inheritance
50-50 as tenants in common. The statute defining an inheritance received by
a married person during marriage as the person's separate property addresses
an inheritance received by "a" and "the" married person in the singular254
and therefore possibly could be construed as not applicable where the
husband and wife were co-equal heirs. De Funiak argues that such a statute
should be construed so as to be consistent with the civil law of Spain and
Mexico from which California's community property regime was derived
and under which the spouses as co-heirs would own the inheritance as
250. Corder, 161 P.3d at 183.
251. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a)(2) (West 2004).
252. Subsection (b) of section 6402 applies if the intestate takers are parents of the decedent.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(b) (West 2009). Subsection (d) calls for grandparents who are the closest
kin of the decedent to take "equally." Id § 6402(d). It is also theoretically possible that the husband
and wife could be collateral co-heirs of the intestate, each being, for example, decedent's second
cousin. As the decedent's closest kin they would take "equally" under subsection (d).
253. "The respective interests of the husband and wife in community property during continuance
of the marriage relation are present, existing, and equal interests." CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (emphasis
added).
254. Section 770 of the Family Code (emphasis added) provides: "(a) Separate property of a
married person includes ... (2) All property acquired by the person after marriage by ... descent."
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25community property. If the California courts agree with De Funiak,
wrongful death damages received by either256 or both of the spouses in lieu
of a community property inheritance should be classified as community
property.
The same analysis applies to bequests and devises that the plaintiff-
spouse or spouses prove they lost due to the tortiously-caused death of a
decedent. If the decedent had a will-or had been proved to have decided
on making a will-with an open-ended bequest or devise to the wife or
husband alone (such as "all my personalty"), the future acquisitions of the
decedent that would have passed through the will had the decedent not died
prematurely would have been the separate property of the party recovering
damages for wrongful death.25 7 Under in-lieu tracing, damages awarded due
to property not passing via such a will would likewise be separate property.
On the other hand, consider a decedent whose will made a joint devise
in equal shares to a husband and wife-the plaintiffs in the wrongful death
suit-and whose will did not specify whether they were to take the property
as community property, tenancy in common, or joint tenancy. Courts
agreeing with De Funiak's view as to the proper construction of Family
Code section 770(a)(2) should classify the damages based on the lost devise
or bequest by either husband or wife alone, or by both as plaintiffs in a
wrongful death suit (or as recipients of a settlement payment) as community
property. 258
b. Loss of Gifts of Cash or Other Property
If, but for having been tortiously killed, the wrongful death decedent
would have made gifts of property to the wife alone or to the husband alone,
they would be the donee's separate property; 25 9 thus wrongful death
damages received by a spouse based on the theory of lost gifts would be
separate property of the claimant under in-lieu tracing. California courts
seem to accept the civil law rule that inter vivos gifts made by a donor to the
husband and wife jointly are classified as community property.260 If there
255. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 42, § 69, at 154 (citing NOVISIMA RECOPLIACION DE
LAS LEYES DE ESPANA, bk. X, cap. 4, law 1 (1805)). See also the nineteenth-century California
cases concerning lucrative acquisitions (which would include inheritances). Supra note 105.
256. The statute of limitations for the wrongful death could run against one of the parent co-heirs
of the decedent but be tolled as to the other so that only he or she obtains a judgment that includes
damages for the lost inheritance that would have been received by both. See San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 726 (Ct. App. 2007). That only the one parent
was able to sue should not alter the community property classification of the recovery, as the
plaintiff who is not time-barred should be viewed as representing the community.
257. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a)(2) (West 2004).
258. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
259. CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a)(2).
260. See supra note 105.
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were evidence that the decedent had, for several years before dying, made
annual gifts of $22,000 (or $24,000 or $26,000 as the annual gift tax
exclusion increased)26' by check made out to the decedent's child and the
spouse of that child, a trier of fact in a wrongful death trial could well
conclude that such a giving practice would have continued had the decedent
not been tortiously killed. Damages awarded to the spouses or to one of
them based on such evidence would be community property under in-lieu
tracing, as would an appropriate portion of a settlement payment to the
spouses or one spouse alone made by the tortfeasor after being advised of
such potential evidence.
c. Lost Earnings of a Decedent Who Was a Minor Child of
Husband or Wife or Both
The decedent could be a young teenager or a pre-teen who was a much-
sought-after model, screen star, musician, etc., whose tortiously-caused
death put an end to a stream of income the young person was collecting as
such a celebrity. The California court of appeal held in 1939 in Santos v.
Santos262 that the earnings of an unemancipated minor child of the husband
or the wife, but not of both, were the separate property of the parent-
spouse.263 This rule should control the classification of wrongful death
damages recovered by that parent based on such lost earnings when the
spouse of the parent is not related to the deceased child. 264 Texas has held
that the earnings of an unemancipated minor who is the child of both the
husband and wife are community property. 265 De Funiak says that "[ulnder
the presumption in favor of community property, certainly it must be
presumed that this is the manner in which the parents do hold [such
261. By doing so the decedent-donor doubles the federal gift tax annual exclusion by creating two
donees. See 26 U.S.C. § 2053(b) (2006). 1 understand the practice to be rather common.
262. 89 P.2d 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939). Santos involved a putative marriage where the parties
took out a marriage license believing in good faith that they needed to do no more to acquire lawful
marital status. Id. at 165. The court applied community property law by analogy, id. at 166, so it is
clear the result would have been the same as to ownership of the earnings of the minor child at issue
had the marriage been lawful rather than putative. See also section 7500(b) of the California Family
Code section, which provides that if one parent of the minor child is dead, the surviving parent "is
entitled" to the earnings of the minor child.
263. Santos, 89 P.2d at 165.
264. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7500 (West 2004).
265. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Stratton, 287 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. App.-Waco 1956) (no
writ).
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earnings] together, and this must be accepted as the rule."266 Section
7500(a) of the California Family Code, in stating that the parents are
"equally entitled" to the earnings of an unemancipated child of both, does
not specifically direct the courts to achieve such equality by classifying such
income as community property in situations where the parents are married to
each other and cohabitating at the time of receipt.267 Nevertheless, I am
confident that California courts will reach that result by following Texas and
De Funiak and that such a rule will control the classification result under in-
lieu tracing in wrongful death cases as well.
d. Loss ofSupport the Decedent Owed as a Matter ofLaw to the
Spouse-Claimant
In some situations, by statute, a child owes a duty to support his mother
or father or both.268 If the decedent child owed such support at the time of
his or her death or if it could be reasonably found that circumstances would
have arisen after the wrongful death of the child that would have caused the
decedent to owe a duty to pay financial support to his mother or father, then
a component of a wrongful death award should include damages based on
the loss of such support. If the decedent were not a child of the spouse of
the parent owed support by the child, the logic that led the Santos court to
hold that earnings of a minor child would be the separate property of the
child's parent when that parent's spouse was not related to the child
probably would apply to the classification of support payments owed a
parent whose spouse was not related to the obligor.269 In both situations the
source of the income is a relationship not connected to the marriage and one
that very likely was established before the marriage. Wrongful death
damages recovered by the parent whose spouse was not related to the
decedent would then be, under in-lieu tracing, the recipient's separate
property.
How would the law classify statutorily-mandated support payments
made by an adult-child to both of his disabled parents or to one disabled
parent, married to the other parent of the adult-child-a parent-spouse who
was not disabled and not entitled to support? The payments are not gifts.
266. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 42, § 68.1, at 150. In California, all property acquired
during marriage is presumed to be community. See, e.g., Rossin v. Rossin (In re Marriage of
Rossin), 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 2009). This presumption is said to be "fundamental" to
the community property system. Duncan v. Duncan (In re Duncan's Estate), 70 P.2d 174, 179 (Cal.
1939).
267. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7500(a).
268. "Except as otherwise provided by law, an adult-child shall, to the extent of his or her ability,
support a parent who is in need and unable to maintain himself or herself by work." CAL. FAM.
CODE § 4400.
269. See supra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
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Although in some situations a parent's abandoning the child will forfeit the
parent's right to statutorily-mandated support,270 there is no requirement that
the parent have expended money or provided labor to care for the child at
any time for the parent to be entitled to support.271 Thus, support payments
received do not have the character of onerous acquisitions.272 Nevertheless,
there seems to be no separate property source, such as a right of personal
security that arose before marriage, underlying one spouse's or both
spouses' right to support from an adult-child. It should follow, then, that the
general presumption in favor of the community 273 will apply to the support
payments, even if made to just one spouse. That will control the
classification of wrongful death damages based on lost support payments.
e. Loss of Services the Decedent Would Have Provided
If it is found to be reasonably likely that the decedent, if living, would
have provided "'services having a financial value"' 274 to a wrongful death
plaintiff, that party may recover damages equal to what it would cost to pay
someone to perform the services. 275 According to the California Supreme
Court, these damages fall into the category of damages based on loss of
direct financial benefits because the economic value of the services can
readily be ascertained, even though the decedent would not have provided
money to the heir asserting the wrongful death claim.276
The nature of the lost services will determine whether the damages
received based on the loss thereof are classified as community or separate
property, or a mix of both. If at the time of death the decedent had been
270. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4411.
271. Consider the case where the mother or father, at the time of the child's birth, is totally
disabled and remains so into the child's adulthood, when the duty of support arises.
272. See Washington v. Washington, 302 P.2d 569, 573 (Cal. 1956) (Carter, J., concurring)
(community acquisitions have their source in an onerous title, i.e., they are earned by labor of a
spouse, or both spouses, or arise out of payment of consideration that was community); DE FUNIAK
& VAUGHN, supra note 42, § 62, at 127.
273. See supra note 266.
274. Corder v. Corder, 161 P.3d 172, 183 (Cal. 2007) (quoting Griffey v. Pac. Electric Ry. Co.,
209 P. 45, 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922)).
275. See Martin v. Mansfeldt, 223 P.2d 501, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
276. Corder, 161 P.3d at 183. It would seem that a loss of "care" the decedent would have
provided to the claimant-spouse, see Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Cal. 1977), and
"protection" that would have been so provided, Corder, 161 P.3d at 183; Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1025,
should be included in the wrongful death damages subcategory of loss of "services," because they
can be valued based on the cost of hiring someone else to provide the care and protection. But
Krouse and Corder, without analysis, dubiously lumped these types of loss with loss of society and
comfort.
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providing no-charge nursing care for his mother and did not view this
nursing care as a gift to his mother, wrongful death damages based on the
value of nursing services the parent ceased receiving on death of her child
should be classified as community property. This is because the receipt of
the services relieved the community of an obligation to provide basic care
for the wife/mother as a member of the community. A community-benefit
test is employed at divorce to classify debts as community or separate in the
process of making an equal division of the community property,27 and it
seems proper to borrow the community-benefit test when classifying
wrongful death damages based on loss of services received by a spouse. If
the decedent would have provided services to both spouses without having
the state of mind that a gift was being made, damages recovered based on
the loss of such services by either spouse or both should likewise be
community property, even if the decedent was related by blood to only one
of the spouses.
Can the presumption in favor of community property classification be
overcome by evidence that the decedent, while alive, had stated that he
considered that he or she was making a gift to his or her mother in
performing nursing services for her, thereby raising the inference that such a
state of mind would have continued into the future as nursing services were
provided, had the decedent not died? There is no clear answer. Federal gift
tax law does not view a gift of services as taxable on the ground that no
property is involved.2 n Section 770(a)(2) of the California Family Code
classifies "all property" received by gift after marriage by a spouse as his or
her separate property. A court would probably hold that the community
property presumption attached to wrongful death damages received during
marriage based on a loss of gifted services cannot be overcome due to the
absence of law viewing services as the equivalent of property.
2. Damages for Loss of Comfort and Society that the Decedent
Would Have Provided
Recall 279 that a Texas court classifying wrongful death damages
received by a spouse based on loss of society (consortium) due to the
tortious killing of the spouse's child found it appropriate to apply, by
analogy, the classification previously made in a Texas case where the harm
to the spouse was loss of consortium provided by the other spouse, resulting
277. See Frick v. Frick (In re Marriage of Frick), 226 Cal. Rptr. 766, 774-75 (Ct. App. 1986)
(debt on loan taken out to raise funds to pay real property taxes on realty that was owned 43.54% by
the community, the balance being separate property of the husband, was 43.54% a community debt).
278. See Comm'r v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352, 353 (10th Cir. 1947); see also 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a)
(2006) (taxing gifts of "property").
279. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
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in a separate property classification. This analogy must be rejected in
California. A 1995 California court of appeal decision held that damages for
loss of spousal consortium must be classified as community property
because they are damages for "personal injur[ies]" under what is now
section 780 of the California Family Code. Section 780 defines personal
injury damages received by a spouse based on a tort occurring during
marriage as community property.280 It has been shown, however, that the
California legislature could not have intended any part of wrongful death
damages to be "personal injur[ies]" to a spouse within the scope of section
780.281 Accordingly, in-lieu tracing should be employed, if possible, to
classify the loss of society portion of the wrongful death damages received
by a married person.
The society and comfort of which the claimant-spouse was deprived
must be of a nature that could not be replaced by hiring a companion;
otherwise, the damages would fall under the lost "services" subcategory of
direct financial loss. 282 The monetary award received for loss of society is
based on the spouse's loss of the joy and pleasure of interacting with a
relative for whom the claimant has feelings of love or affection.283 Such
good feelings are not property. Since the loss of society damages are not
awarded as a replacement for lost property, classic in-lieu tracing arguably
cannot be done in this situation. One possible judicial response to this
conclusion is a holding with respect to the loss-of-consortium component of
wrongful death damages that the community property presumption attaching
to the cause of action arising during marriage, and damages flowing from it,
cannot be overcome. Loss of society damages would thus be community
280. Meighan v. Shore, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 744, 749 (Ct. App. 1995). Craddock v. KMart Corp.,
107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 881 (Ct. App. 2001), assumed that a community property classification would have
been appropriate for damages claimed by a husband for loss of his wife's consortium arising out of a
tort, as to which the wife's negligence was 10% of the cause of the resulting injuries. The Craddock
court stated that the issue it faced was whether to apply Family Code section 783, under which the
wife's negligence would not be imputed to the husband and would entitle him to a 100% recovery,
or Civil Code section 1431.2, under which the tortfeasor the husband sued was liable for non-
economic damages only to the extent of his 90% of fault in causing the accident. Id. at 888. Section
783, as judicially expanded to deal with comparative negligence in Lantis v. Condon, 157 Cal. Rptr.
22, 24 (Ct. App. 1979), would not have been at issue if damages for loss of spousal consortium were
classified as separate property, for it could not then have been contended that the negligent wife
would have benefitted from her own wrong had the husband obtained a 100% recovery.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 274-77.
283. '"[F]actors relevant in assessing a claimed loss of society, comfort, and protection may
include the closeness of the family unit at issue, the warmth of feeling between the family members,
and the character of the deceased as 'kind and attentive' or 'kind and loving."' Corder v. Corder,
161 P.3d 172, 184 (Cal. 2007) (quoting Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Cal. 1977)).
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property, even if the decedent were not related to the spouse of the claimant
receiving a share of such damages.
Alternatively, California courts could trace such damages to a
nonproprietary source, such as the capacity of the claimant-spouse to feel
pleasure in sharing experiences with a beloved relative-the decedent.28 4
Such a capacity, although not property, was possessed by the claimant-
spouse before marriage and, in that sense, is analogous to property that is
separate because it was owned by a spouse before marriage. Under this
approach, the fact that the relationship of the claimant-spouse with the
decedent did not begin until after the claimant married does not compel a
community property classification.285 Particularly in cases where the
decedent was not related to the person married to the party recovering
wrongful death damages, the separate property classification seems more
intuitively correct, since a community classification would treat the
unrelated spouse as suffering equally along with the claimant.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The development of the in-lieu tracing doctrine-particularly as it is
now applied in workers' compensation cases like Raphael-requires
overruling the 1922 Keena decision, the source of the rule that a wrongful
death award received by a spouse must be classified as 100% community
property. Most components of such a wrongful death award can be traced to
a separate source via in-lieu tracing, resulting in a separate property
classification. An inability to overcome the presumption that property
acquired during marriage is community property may lead to classifying one
or two of the possible components of the wrongful death recovery received
by a married person as community property.
284. The Texas Supreme Court, in its decision holding damages for loss of spousal consortium to
be separate property, said the recovery is based on "damages to the emotional interests" of the
claimant-spouse. Whittelsey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex. 1978).
285. The illogic of making the classification turn on when the relationship began can be
illustrated by a hypothetical case. Wife is the aunt of two nieces, A and B, tortiously killed, leaving
Wife as their sole heir. A was born and began interacting with Wife six months before Wife married
Husband; B was born and began interacting with Wife ten months after the marriage. Surely it
would be legally indefensible to classify Wife's damages based on loss of society with A as her
separate property, but damages based on loss of society with B as community.
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